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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is before the Court on this Court's Order Granting Petitioner's Petition
for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This Court stated the issue in its Order Granting Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari
as follows:
Whether equitable estoppel may apply to modify the scope of an insurance
policy's coverage where the scope of coverage is misstated by a company agent prior to
the insured's purchase of the policy.
More specifically to facts of the case, the issue can be otherwise stated as follows:
Where unambiguous terms of a written insurance policy provide that underinsured
motorist (UIM) coverage only covers an insured when the insured is in, entering or
alighting from a motor vehicle, should a court expand that coverage, after an accident, to
cover the insured as a pedestrian, merely because the insured orally alleges he was given
some examples mentioning him as a pedestrian by an independent sales agent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party is entitled to summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c); First Amer. Title Ins. Co. v. IB. Ranch, Inc. 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998); Clover
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, "questions of
contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on
such questions, we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness."
1

First Amer. Title Ins. Co. v. IB. Ranck Inc. 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998); Zions First Nat'l
Bank v National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
See Record at 40 for Auto Owners Motion for Summary Judgment where the issue was
preserved.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent, (hereafter "Youngblood") sued petitioner, Auto Owners Insurance
Company (hereafter uAuto Owners") for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for an
accident in which he was a pedestrian. Youngblood's company purchased insurance from
Auto Owners (hereafter the "Policy"). However, the UIM coverage in the Policy only
applied if Youngblood was a passenger or operator in, on, or in the immediate act of
entering or alighting from a motor vehicle. The lower court granted summary judgment
to Auto Owners, based upon the unambiguous terms of the Policy. The Court of
Appeals, in Youngblood v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 154, 111 P.3d 829,
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding Auto Owners estopped
from denying UIM coverage for Youngblood as a pedestrian.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(The Undisputed Facts as to the Accident at Issue)
1. On or about December 30, 1997, Youngblood was a pedestrian, walking across
a parking lot toward a medical plaza when he was struck by an automobile (hereafter the
•'Accident") driven by Rachel Louis Cooksey (hereafter the "Tortfeasor")- R. at 10-11
(Amended Complaint, paras. 6, 8, 10 and 12); R. at 50-51(Pltf s depo. at 37-38). It is
undisputed that he was a pedestrian at the time of the Accident. Id
2

2. Youngblood settled with the Tortfeasor for her policy limits. R. at 109-111.
3. Youngblood alleges that his injuries exceeded the policy limits of the
Tortfeasor's available insurance. R. at 11 (Amended Complaint, para. 12).
(Lack of allegations of pre-accident acts supposedly justifying estoppel)
4. In his complaint, Youngblood claimed that Auto Owners owes Youngblood
underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for injuries which exceeded the available
insurance of the Tortfeasor. R. at 11-12 (Amended Complaint, paras. 14, 12, and 16).
5. Youngblood's Amended Complaint contains no allegation that he was induced
to enter into the insurance contract by pre-policy representations of a sale's agent which
might estop Auto Owners should be estopped from denying coverage. R. at 10-14 (entire
Amended Complaint). Youngblood does allege, however, that Auto-Owners should be
estopped from denying UIM pedestrian coverage, however, the only allegations in
support of estoppel are that Auto Owners took actions after the accident, not before,
indicating at first that there may be coverage, but later denying coverage. R. at 12
(Amended Complaint, para. 15).
6. Although Estoppel is not claimed in Youngblood's Amended Complaint
regarding the pre-policy statements of any sales agent, in his deposition he alleges that an
independent sales agent made certain statements to him regarding pedestrians or nonmotorists before he purchased the policy. See the following paragraphs.
7. Youngblood states in his deposition, but not in his Amended Complaint, that he
purchased the Policy at issue through a Mark, last name not remembered by Youngblood,

n

J

who was an employee of Cottonwood Insurance, not an employee of Auto Owners. R, at
96 (Pltfs depo. At 103:11-13).
8. Youngblood states that the Cottonwood Insurance agent stated the following:
"But he said, wHey, underinsured and uninsured, the reason you have
these is you have to protect your family/ And he said, 'what if
you're walking down the street? Without these' - what do you call
them? -'without these riders' - 1 think that's what they call them.
He said, w Without these riders, you know, you've got nothing.'
Now, he said, The only thing that I would recommend, other than
this, if you don't get this, is to get some kind of wage protection.'
R. at 96-97 (Pltfs depo. at 103:25 to 104:9).
9. Youngblood continued, regarding the Cottonwood Insurance agent:
A. "Well, Mark said, and I quote, 'Hey, if you're walking down the
street, you've got nothing if you have - if you don't have
underinsured and uninsured motorist and somebody runs you over,'
and I chuckled. I thought that was kind of lame. Actually, I thought
it was kind of lame because I could never picture me walking down
the street and somebody running over me."
R. at 97-98 (Pltfs depo. at 104:21 to 105: 2).
10. Youngblood even said the Cottonwood Insurance agent mentioned coverage if
Youngblood is sitting at his desk; Youngblood appears to equate that with underinsured
motorist coverage, as if a car might hit him at his desk, which does not make sense:
"[Mark said], "Hey, you could be walking - you could be sitting at
your desk or walking down the street' - that's a quote. vYou could
be sitting at your desk or walking the street and if you don't have the
coverage, you've got nothing.'
R. at 98-99. (Pltfs depo. at 105:11-15).
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11. Youngblood said that the example of walking down the street was "lame,"
thereby appearing to imply that it was not reasonable or believable. R. at 97 (para. 9,
above).
12. Youngblood was then asked if he relied on the example of walking down the
street or sitting at his desk. Although he said, "Well, yes," he went on to indicate he
really wanted coverage as a motorist:
Q. "Did you rely on that statement [the statement in the immediately
preceding quote] in part in purchasing this insurance:
A. Well, yes. These guys [Mark and his brother], I figured, were not
only selling a lot of insurance and knew what they were doing, but I
guess that truth is that I knew a lot of guys didn't have insurance and
I knew that 1 drove some nice vehicles. And if somebody were to
slam into one of my cars...That's what I pictured."
R. at 98 (Pltf s depo. at 105:16-24).
13. The above facts regarding the alleged conversation with the insurance agent
from Cottonwood Insurance are denied by Auto Owners, but Auto Owners admits, for
purposes of this appeal only, that such are the facts in a light more favorable to
Youngblood.
(The Undisputed Facts as to the Lack of Coverage Under the Policy for
Accidents wherein the Respondent is a Pedestrian)
14. Auto Owners wrote an insurance policy to Youngblood Home Improvement,
Inc., not to Youngblood individually (hereafter the "Policy"). R. at 10-11 (Amended
Complaint, para. 8),Addendum at 14, 15, and 16.
15. Youngblood was an officer and owner of the insured, Youngblood Home
Improvement, Inc. R. at 10 (Amended Complaint, para, 7).
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16. The Policy covered certain specifically designated motor vehicles, and UIM
coverage if those vehicles were involved in an accident with an underinsured motorist.
See the following paragraphs.
17. The UIM coverage at issue in the Policy only covers insureds who are
"occupying" one of the vehicles specifically identified in the policy. The underinsured
coverage in the Policy unambiguously states:
"2.a. We will pay compensatory damages any person is legally
entitled to recover:
(1) from the owner or operator of an underinsured
automobile;
(2) for bodily injury sustained while occupying an
automobile that is covered by SECTION II-LIABILITY
COVERAGE of the policy."
R. at 61 (the Policy - Bold and all caps in the original); Addendum at 35.
18. The words "occupying" and "automobile," in the immediately preceding
quote with regard to underinsured motorist coverage are defined terms in the Policy. The
word "occupying" is defined as follows:
"1. Definitions. The following definitions apply in addition to those
contained in SECTION I-DEFINITIONS of the policy.
A. Occupying means being in or on an automobile as a passenger
or operator, or being engaged in the immediate acts of entering,
boarding or alighting from an automobile.
R. at 60 (the Policy - Bold and caps in the original); Addendum at 34.
19. Thus, in order to be covered under the UIM coverage under the Policy, the
injury must be sustained while the injured party is "occupying an automobile" which
means being "in or on an automobile as a passenger or operator or being engaged in the
6

immediate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from an automobile." Para. 18, above.
(Emphasis added).
20. Youngblood received a copy of the Policy before the Accident. R. at 103
(Pltf s depo. at 117:9-15).
21. The cover sheet to the Policy is entitled UA Quick Guide to you Policy" and
states at the top:
READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY. This cover sheet provides only a
brief outline of some of the important features of your policy. This is not
the insurance contract and only the actual policy provisions will control.
The policy itself sets forth, in detail, the rights and obligations of both you
and your insurance company. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT
THAT YOU READ YOUR POLICY.
Addendum at 17.
22. Although he had received a copy of the Policy, Youngblood did not see that
the UIM coverage under the Policy covered him when he was a motorist, but not when he
was doing other things such as walking, sitting at his desk, etc. R. at 105 (para. 3).
23. The Policy did state that if the named insured was "an individual" then
pedestrian coverage would exist:
b. If the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual this
coverage is extended as follows:
(1) We will pay damages you are legally entitled to recover:
(a) From the owner of operator of any Underinsured
Automobile
(b) For bodily injury you sustain:
1) When you are a pedestrian.
R. at 61, and 63 (Pltf s Memo, at para. 4) (bold in the original, underlining added);
Addendum at 35.

7

24. However, the first named insured in the Policy is Youngblood Home
Improvement, Inc., not an individual. R. at 64, para. 1 (Respondent's Statement of
Facts).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In his amended complaint, Youngblood did not allege that any representations
prior to his purchase of the policy should estop Auto-Owners from denying the UIM
pedestrian coverage which did not exist in the Policy. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
should not have found estoppel based on pre-purchase statements.
Any pre-policy sales representations were made by an independent agent from
Cottonwood Insurance, not an agent or employee of Auto-Owners, therefore AutoOwners should not be estopped by any such statements. Under Utah law, each party
should be responsible only for that party's own fault, and not for the fault of others
including independent contractors.
This Court, a prior panel of the court of appeals, and the majority of the states
support the general position that estoppel may not be used to expand coverage beyond
that which is provided by written contract in a policy. Sound policy reasons support this
position including, (1) claims of additional coverage are too easily made by someone
trying to recover money, (2) the insurer never received a premium for such expanded
coverage, (3) the insurer did not take such risks into account in determining its total risks,
(4) a written document is the best and most reliable evidence of a contract. See also the
next paragraph on parole evidence.
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Under long-standing principles, parole evidence should not be used to vary the
terms of a written contract, including an insurance policy, unless there is an ambiguity
requiring clarification. With respect to an ambiguity in an insurance policy, there is still
no need for parole evidence because any ambiguity will merely be resolved in favor of
coverage. In the present Policy, there is no ambiguity.
Youngbiood received a copy of the very understandable Policy, and should held to
a duty to read it; otherwise reliance on pre-policy statements is not reasonable.
The pre-policy statements by the Cottonwood Insurance agent were not promises
of coverage, but mention of accidents when someone is walking down the street or sitting
at his desk. Youngbiood thought them "lame," desiring coverage for his company's cars.
When asked if he relied on the "lame" examples he questionable stated that he did. Thus
any reliance is unreasonable.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
YOUNGBLOOD DID NOT ALLEGE IN HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT THAT
ANY PRE-POLICY REPRESENTATIONS JUSTIFIED ESTOPPING AUTOOWNERS FROM DENYING UIM COVERAGE.
In his Amended Complaint, Youngbiood did not allege that any pre-Policy
representations were made by a sales agent at all, let alone that he relied on any such
representations to his detriment, nor that Auto-owners should be estopped from denying
coverage in the Policy as a result of any such pre-Policy representations. See Facts, above, paras.
5-6. As grounds for relief, Youngbiood does allege that well after the accident, Auto Owners at
first indicated there may be coverage, but later denied it. Facts, above, para. 5. Youngbiood first

9

mentions pre-policy statements, representations by the Cottonwood sales agent, in his deposition,
but not in his Amended Complaint. Facts, above, paras. 5-6
The only mention of estoppel in the Amended Complaint is in paragraph 15 thereof (R. at
12 and 57) wherein only post-accident representations are asserted as grounds for estoppel.
Facts, above, para. 5.
Because the Amended Complaint does not allege any representations prior to the
purchase of the insurance as grounds for estoppel, this court should not consider pre-Policy
representations as grounds for estoppel, as the Court of Appeals erroneously did.
POINT II
AN INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENCY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE
TO CREATE UNEXPECTED, UNINTENDED COVERAGE FOR AN
INSURER; WHERE AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR/SALES
AGENT MAKES REPRESENTATIONS AS TO WHAT A FUTURE
POLICY MAY COVER, THAT AGENT/AGENCY, IF ANYONE,
SHOULD BE LIABLE, NOT THE INSURER.
In 1986, the Utah legislature did away with joint and several liability in favor of
the more equitable and fair doctrine that each party should be liable only for that party's
own percentage of fault, and not for the fault of others. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40
states:
"Subject to section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage
or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant."
See also cases interpreting and upholding that section of the code.
In the present case, the sales agent, who allegedly made pre-Policy statements
relating to persons walking down the street or sitting at a desk, was an independent agent
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working for Cottonwood Insurance Agency. See Facts, above, paras. 7-12 . If this court
should determine that there should some form of liability for pre-Policy statements made,
then the liability should be that of the independent contractor sales agency, and not the
insurer. Such liability could be in the form of some type of malpractice or other fault.
However the insurer, which was not a party to such statements or representations, and in
good faith, accepted a premium based upon coverage only for certain expected risks,
should not be at fault, and not be through estopped to deny coverage. Unintended
coverage for totally unexpected risks, outside the insurance contract, should not be
imposed on the insurer based upon actions of an independent contractor. That would be
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Utah statutes on fault, and the related case law
supporting those statutes.
An independent insurance agency is just that, independent. The insurer cannot
control such an agency, except to the extent the insurer may not let that agency sell the
insurer's policies any more, after demonstration of some bad faith. The insurer doesn't
control the specific representations made. The insurer can only create the policy and
warn the prospective insured to read it carefully, as was done in this case. The
independent agent should not be able to create coverage which is not expected or
intended by the insurer, whether through a lame" examples not relied upon (Facts, above,
paras. 9-11, or reasonable appearing promises relied upon. Even if, somehow, this Court
might feel that an employee of the insurer might be able to create coverage which does
not exist in the policy, through estoppel, such are not the facts of this case, and such a
holding should await another day. No employee of the insurer was involved in the pre11

Policy sales representations regarding the future Policy at issue. See also Point VI,
below, discussing the Harr case.
POINT III
UNDER PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, NO UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
WAS AVAILABLE TO YOUNGBLOOD AS A NON-MOTORIST
UNDER THE POLICY.
Contract interpretation is a matter of law. For decades, the Courts in Utah have
held that contract interpretation is a matter of law, not fact. See, for example, Saunders v.
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991) ("Interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for
the court to determine, unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties'
intent... is necessary to establish the terms of the contract"). Whether an ambiguity
exists is likewise a matter of law. See Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co., v. Pioneer Oil &
Gas Co. 899 P. 2d. 766, 770 (Utah 1995).
Insurance contracts are no different. Insurance contracts are the same as other
contracts and should likewise be interpreted as a matter of law. See Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, P5; Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P. 2d. 1272
(Utah. 1993); Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68 wherein the court stated, ".
. . [BJecause an insurance policy is the contract between the insurer and the insured, we
first look to the plain language of the policy to ascertain its meaning if it is not
ambiguous. Id. at Holmes Dev, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, P24, 48 P.3d 895; Miller v.
USAA, Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 Ut 6, P49, 44 P.3d 663." Id. at P21. In Holmes Dev., LLC v.
Cook,, above, this Court stated:
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"a title insurance policy like other insurance policies, serves as a
contract between the insurer and the insured, and as such 4is subject
to the general rules of contract construction.' Miller v. USAA Cas.
Ins. Co., . . . [above] (quoting S. W. Energy Corp v. Cont'l Ins. Co.,
199 UT. 23, p!2, 974 P.2d 1239; Accord First Am. Title Insurance
Co. v. JB Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1998)."
Id. at P24. Thus, interpretation of an insurance contract is the same as interpretation of
other contracts. See also Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah
1993); ("An insurance policy is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and
is construed pursuant to the same rules applied to ordinary contracts."). The court of
appeals has followed this precedent and held the same. See Village Inn Apartments v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990), ("Insurance policies
are merely contracts and should thus be interpreted under the same rules governing
ordinary contracts.").
Contracts are interpreted using their plain meaning and giving effect to all words.
In interpretation of an insurance contract, as any other contract, the commonly accepted
meanings of words are considered, and a contract is read as a whole in an attempt to
harmonize and give affect to all of the contract provisions. See Nielsen v. O'Riley, 848
P,2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992) ("The terms of insurance contracts . . . are to be interpreted in
a court with their usual meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to
harmonize and give affect to all of the contract provisions.")
Parole evidence will not be used to vary the terms of an insurance contract. In
Braughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989) this Court stated,
"if a policy of insurance is clear and unambiguous, the words are to be taken and
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understood in their plain ordinary and popular sense as an average or reasonable person
with ordinary understanding would construe them." Id. at 1108, quoting Clark v
Prudential Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487, 464 P.2d 253, 257 (1970). In the case of insurance
contracts, instead of the use of parole evidence to vary the contract, where there is an
ambiguity, the ambiguity will merely be resolved in favor of coverage rather than
requiring parole evidence. See American Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd, 568
P.2d 731 (Utah 1977), wherein the court stated, uIf an insurance policy is ambiguous or
uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible to different interpretations, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of insurance coverage". Id. at 734, cited favorably in Perkins, below,
814 P.2d 1129 (Utah App. 1991). Thus where a contract of insurance is concerned one
doesn't get to parole evidence. If there is no ambiguity, no parole evidence will be
allowed. If there is an ambiguity, it is resolved in favor of coverage. Therefore, no
parole evidence is needed or allowed.
Unambiguous lack of UIM pedestrian coverage in the Policy when the insured is
not a motorist. In the present case, it is undisputed that the Policy, clearly and
unequivocally, without any ambiguity, states that insureds are covered only when they
are ^occupying an automobile." See Facts, above, paras. 17-18. The term "occupying"
an automobile is clearly and without ambiguity defined as "being in or on an automobile"
or " being engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from an
automobile." See Facts, above, paragraph 18.
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In the present case, it is undisputed, that Youngblood was a pedestrian at the time
of the Accident at issue, and was not in or on an automobile, nor in the immediate act of
entering, boarding or alighting from an automobile. See Facts, above, para. 1.
Because it is undisputed that the appellant was a pedestrian, and because it is
undisputed that the insurance Policy at issue does not cover pedestrians, there is no UIM
coverage under the Policy and Auto Owners was entitled to the summary judgment
granted by the trial court.
The Policy, in clear, simple language, states that coverage is only extended to
pedestrians, if the named insured is an individual, not a corporation or other legal entity.
Facts, above, para. 23. The Policy was a business policy issued to Youngblood Home
Improvement, Inc., not to an individual. Facts, above, para. 24. There is no ambiguity
which would require parole evidence for clarification.
POINT IV
ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED TO CREATE COVERAGE
WHERE NONE EXTSTED, WHICH COVERAGE THE INSURER DID
NOT INTEND, EXPECT OR PROVIDE FOR.
Admittedly there is a split in authority among the state courts concerning whether
estoppel can create coverage where none was intended or expected. An ALR report, 1
A.L.R.3d 1139, which includes cases as recent as 2004 (See cases at 1 A.L.R.3d 1139,
para. 3) states:
While waiver and estoppel have been held applicable to nearly every area
in which an insurer may deny liability, the courts of most jurisdictions
agree that these concepts are not available to broaden the coverage of a
policy so as to protect the insured against risks not included therein or
expressly excluded therefrom.
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Id. at § 2. (Emphasis added). The report continued:
It is a rule of general application in most jurisdictions that the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel are not available to bring within the coverage of an
insurance policy risks not covered by its terms, or expressly excluded
therefrom.
Id. at § 3. (Emphasis added). The report does admit that, "The contrary view, however, is
represented in the decisions from some jurisdictions, . . ." Id. at § 2.
Utah cases. This honorable Court has not decided the precise issue here.
However, in Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P. 2d. 1272 (Utah. 1993), this
Court was faced with a very similar argument that an insured had certain reasonable
expectations with regard to an insurance policy, which expectations were not included in
the policy language itself. This court stated that it must enforce an unambiguous
insurance contract, and "In general, a court may not rewrite an insurance contract for the
parties if the language is clear and unambiguous." Id. at 1275, quoted also in Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT. 47, P6.
In Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company, et al, 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah
App. 1991), a different panel of the court: of appeals from the panel deciding this case
below, faced an argument that is almost identical to the argument of the Appellant in the
case at bar, that is, as a result of equitable estoppel, the plaintiff should be able to obtain
coverage for which he had never paid a premium, and which was never intended or
expected by the insurer, and was not provided in the insurance contract. That panel made
quick work of that argument by finding that not only Utah, but the great majority of states
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will not allow insurance coverage to be increased or expanded beyond that which appears
in the policy of insurance, through the doctrine of estoppel. The court stated:
"The great majority of states dealing with the doctrine of estoppel
have held that it cannot be used to bring risks which were not
covered by the terms of the policy within coverage of the policy.
See e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. v. Zumsteim, 138 Ariz. 469, 675 P.2d 729
(Ariz. App. 1983); Topeka Tent and Awning Co. v. Glen Falls Ins.
Co., 13 Kan. App. 2d 553, 774 P.2d 984 (1989); Boyer Metal Fab.
Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 Or. App. 103, 750 P.2d 1195,
review denied, 305 Or 672, 757 P.2d 422 (1988); St. Paul Fire and
Maurine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Dis. No. 7, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo.
1988).
Id. at 1131 (Emphasis added).
The general law of estoppel also demonstrates the lack of applicability thereof to
facts such as those asserted by Youngblood. For example, in Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d
570 (Utah 1953), quoted with approval by this Court as recently as 1999 in Numley v.
Westates Casing Servs. Inc., 1999 UT 100, this Court declared that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel only applies where the alleged representations are as to past or present,
not future facts. For example, the court stated, "generally, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is applicable only when a misrepresentation is made as to past or present facts; .
. ." Id. at 557 (Emphasis added). In the present case, the plaintiff asserts that an
independent agent made statements which might, at best, apply in the future. See Facts,
above, paras. 7-12.
Representations as to the future has application, but a narrow application not
applicable to the facts in the case. The quote from Ravarino, in the immediately
preceding paragraph, goes on to state, ". . .[A]n exception is recognized when a
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misrepresentation as to the future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the
party making the misrepresentation." Ravarino, above, at 575. The court then analyzed
several cases finding:
"the common element in these cases is that the promise as to future
conduct constitutes a manifestation that the promisor will abandon
an existing right which he possesses. It is apparent that an attempt to
apply this doctrine to the oral promise of Mr. Price . . . is factually
impossible unless the phrase is to be distorted beyond meaning."
Id. at 575. A legal waiver under Utah law, which is necessary for estoppel arising out of
representations as to future facts, is very difficult to establish. A waiver must be a very
direct, clear expression that a party is aware of a known right and specifically intends to
waive that right. In US Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security Inv. Ltd., 2002 UT. 14, this court
stated:
"The legal standard necessary to find waiver is clear. 'Waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver,
there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.' Soter's, Inc. v.
DeseretFed Savs. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)
quoting Phoenix, Inc. v. Health, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 21112(1936))".
Id. at PI6. This Court went on to indicate that courts must be "especially careful" with
regard to questions of waiver "especially where such waiver is merely implied." Id.
Cases from other jurisdictions. Besides the jurisdictions and cases cited by the
Court of Appeals in Perkins, quoted above, many other cases hold that estoppel cannot be
used to expand coverage in a written policy. The Court of Appeals in the decision below,
Youngblood v. Auto Owners, 2005 UT App 154, P 16, (See Addendum to this brief) cited
three cases on point which hold that estoppel may not be used to expand an insurance
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policy's coverage to risks not covered by its terms or risks expressly excluded from
coverage: Nicholls v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 244 F.Supp. 2d 1144, 1157 (D. Colo.
2003); Harasyn v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. 75 S.W.3d 696, 702 (Ark. 2002); and
Ouillian v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 6 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939). In
addition to these cases, the following are illustrative.
In Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Company v. James, 146 S.W. 3d 340 (Tex.
Oct. 2004), the court stated:
Under Texas law, it has long been established that waiver and
estoppel cannot be used to create insurance coverage . . . waiver and
estoppel cannot enlarge the risks covered by a policy and cannot be
used to create a new and different contract with respect to the risk
covered and the insurance extended.
Id. at 350, citing to prior precedent. The court used principles of contact interpretation to
resolve the case, similar to the approach under Point III, above, resolving ambiguities in
favor of the insured.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany Co. Sch. Dist No. 7, 763 P.2d 1255
(Wyo. 1988), the insured claimed uan alleged misrepresentation of policy coverage by
Motis," who iwhad arranged the purchases and renewals of the policies . . . " Id. at 1257.
The court cited precedent that, "It has been broadly stated that the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel cannot be used to extend coverage of an insurance policy or create a primary
liability . . . Under no conditions can the coverage or restrictions on coverage be extended
by waiver or estoppel." Id. at 1261. The court cited other precedents, concluding that,
%t

[T]he coverage afforded by the policy cannot be expanded by estoppel or waiver on the

basis of the representations of Motis." Id. at 1262.
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In Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moeder, 48 P.3d 1 (Kan. App. 2002), the court
determined that policy language was not ambiguous which stated there would be no
coverage unless all of the insured's vehicles were insured by the insurer. The insurer
discovered that the plaintiff owned a large Kenworth truck not insured with them, and
denied coverage. The plaintiff then alleged that his agent 'told him it was not capable on
providing such coverage [for the Kenworth truck]," therefore the insurer should be
estopped from asserting lack of coverage for his not insuring the Kenworth with the
insurer. In spite of such pre-policy representations, the court stated, "Kansas cases hold
that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to expand coverage of an insurance policy where
the policy unambiguously excludes coverage of the insured's claim [citations omitted]."
Id. at 5. The court continued, "Since the insurance policy unambiguously excludes
coverage of the claim made in this case, Moeder [the insured] may not invoke the
principles of waiver and estoppel." Id. at 5.
In Wysong and Miles Co. v Employers ofWausau, et al, 4 F. Supp. 2d 421
(M.D.N.C. 1998), the court stated the following, applying North Carolina law,
"Assuming that Wysong could establish all of the elements of an estoppel claim, this
Court should not rewrite Wysong's policies to extend coverage to risks that the policies
did not cover by their terms." Id. at 432. The court held that the rule "prevents courts
from rewriting insurance policies and thereby obligating insurance companies to pay for
losses for which they did not charge a premium, [citation omitted]." Id. at 432.
In Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Sliter, 555 F.Supp. 269 (E.D. Mich. 1983),
concerning pre-purchase representations, the court stated:
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"The law in Michigan is that an insurer 'is not liable on erroneous
representations by an agent as to the extent of coverage of a plainly
worded policy, so as to entitle the insured to equitable relief, even
though the latter failed to read the instrument.' The policy should not
and will not be reformed by this Court to provide for coverage not
agreed to by the insurer."
Id. at 371.
In Parris & Son, Inc. v. Campbell, 196 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1973), concerning
representations as to the extent of coverage prior to and after the purchase of the
insurance, the court found such representation to be opinion, compared to the language of
the policy itself. The court stated, "Nor does the expression of an opinion as to coverage
work an estoppel — even against the agent who voiced it, or against his principal," citing
prior Georgia law. Id. at 338. See Hartford, the 1992 Georgia case mentioned under Point
V, below.
In Reinsurance Assoc, of Minn. v. Timmer, 641 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2002), facing
pre-policy representations by the insurer's agent, the court stated, "RAM [the insurer]
correctly notes that estoppel cannot be used to enlarge the coverage of an insurance
policy. See Shannon v. Great Am. Ins. Co. 276 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. 1979)". Id. at 310311.
In Zarella v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 824 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 2003), the insured
complained of impressions left by the sales agent that the total cash value of a policy was
contingent on the annual dividend and if the policy is surrendered between anniversary
dates the insured will receive a pro rata share of the annual dividend. After discussing the
elements of estoppel, the court stated:
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The court, however, may not invoke the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to expand the scope of coverage of an insurance policy,
[citation omitted]. Additionally, quasi-contractual remedies such as
equitable estoppel are inapplicable when the parties are bound by an
express contract. See JNExploration & Production v. Western Gas
Resources, Inc. 153 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1998) (interpreting North
Dakota law); Hodgkins v. New England Telephone Co. 82 F.3d
1226, 1232 (Tsl Cir. 1996) (interpreting Maine law); Cloverdale
Equipment Co v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir.
1989) (interpreting Michigan law); Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph
Chapek, Inc. 828 F. 2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1987) (interpreting
Pennsylvania law)."
Id. at 1260 (Emphasis added).
See also United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff 155 P.3d 488, 497 (4th Cir. 1988)
(applying Maryland law that "waiver or estoppel may occur only when it does not create
new coverage; extension of coverage may only be created by a new contract."); Pace v.
Fin. Sec. Life of Miss., 608 So. 2d 1135, 1149 (Miss. 1992) (the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel may not operate to create coverage or expand existing coverage to risks which,
by the terms of the policy, are expressly excluded.)
In addition, see the cases under Point V, below denying estoppel for the reason
that the insured has a duty to read the policy.
Policy reasons for the majority rule. There are several policy reasons why other
jurisdictions have, and this court should, hold that estoppel cannot expand coverage
beyond the terms of the policy and the risks expected and intended to be covered. Those
policy reasons include the following.
Contracts are agreements among parties which the courts should not re-write for
one of the parties, through estoppel. The unambiguous provisions of a contract should not
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be altered by parole evidence. See Point III, above, and this Court's quote from Alf,
above, that the courts, "may not rewrite an insurance contract.v Alfat 1275.
Allegations after an accident, to try to recover monies from a deep pocket such as
an insurance company, can be too easily made, and disproved with too much difficulty.
A fact finder could be sympathetic to an injured party and lean in that party's favor, in the
face of denials by the sale's agent. A ruling allowing such estoppel, could encourage the
easy act of asserting estoppel to create new coverage by merely alleging representations
of non-existent coverage.
Where there is a writing that should control. A writing is far more reliable than
the oral allegations of a person seeking to gain money by asserting coverage not in the
existing written policy.
When the insured has been provided a copy of the policy, she has the means to
determine the truth rather than allegedly relying on supposed oral statements which may
not have existed or may have been misconstrued.
Representations of future facts would only be opinion of what may occur and
should not be reasonably relied upon. See this Court's Numley case, above.
No premium has been paid for the expanded coverage and the risks of loss not
taken into account calculated. To obtain insurance coverage, a party pays a specific
premium for a specific risk or coverage. Premiums are set by actuaries to cover expected
claims by ail insureds based upon expected statistics. If estoppel could create coverage
not expected or intended by the insurer, no premium was paid, and therefore the risk is
not covered by paid-in funds. The actuarial applecart is overturned. That would certainly
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be the case if more people were encouraged to assert coverage for risks not in the
insurance policy if estoppel is held to create unexpected coverage.
More than the lack of one premium, the unexpected risk itself could be vastly
greater than any corresponding premium. The premium may be small in comparison to
the insurance coverage sought by way of estoppel. The liability to an insurer could be in
the hundreds of thousands or even the millions of dollars if parties could assert estoppel
to obtain unexpected and unintended coverage. The actuarial applecart is really upset.
One might argue that an insurance company should be able to shoulder additional,
unexpected huge risks, however even if that may be the case with some very solvent
insurers, covering large, unexpected risks might cause the demise of other insurers.
Insurers and their actuaries should be able to assess their potential risks, and rely on those
assessments without having them turned upside down by unexpected and unintended
claims through estoppel.
As is the case in the present matter, an insurer should not suffer where an
independent contracting sales agent is alleged to have made pre-contract representations
inconsistent with the policy written by the insurer. See Point II, above. An insurer
should only be liable for its own fault, and not that of an independent insurance sales
agency, even if pre-policy representations could be actionable.
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POINT V
ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT APLY WHERE THE INSURED RECEIVES
A COPY OF THE POLICY AND HAS OPPORTUNITY TO READ IT
AND DETERMINE THE COVERAGES THEREIN.
In Perkins, above, the Court of Appeals stated that representations are not
reasonably relied upon when one has the means to ascertain the actual content of the
insurance policy, or the actual truth. The court stated, quoting from two prior cases from
this Court:
"'A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or acts
if they are contrary to his knowledge of the truth or if he had the
means by which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the
truth/ Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981)
(citing Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970)).
Id. at 1130. (Emphasis added). The court continued by stating that, "Mrs. Perkins had
the means by which she could have ascertained the contents of Great-West's policy." Id.
The court then stated that, "given Mrs. Perkins' failure to learn the terms of her insurance
policy, her reliance thereon [or alleged representations] was not reasonable." Id.
(Emphasis added).
Auto Owners must admit that this Court, in a three to two split decision, has
applied estoppel to insurance contracts, but only in a very narrow context, where the
insurance company failed or refused to provide a copy of the policy to its insured: the
insured could not read and verify coverage. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983) (hereafter Martinez), the majority decision held,
^that an insurance company is estopped from relying upon an exclusion in a policy if the
company has failed to deliver the policy or certificate of insurance to the insured, or any
other document stating the exclusion." Id. at 501. The above language of the majority
seems to state that if there were any possibility that the insured could see the exclusion or
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a representation of the exclusion, not even the policy, such as "a certificate of insurance
or any other document stating the exclusion" the majority would not even apply estoppel
in such case.
The dissent in Martinez, by two justices would not even apply estoppel under the
facts of that case, stating, "The majority's decision injects a new provision into insurance
contracts, a provision whose effects are almost impossible to gauge. . . ." Id. at 502-503.
The dissent continued, 'The potential effects of the majority's decision are even more
far-reaching . . . the majority's holding suggests that an insured who can convince a jury
that he had not received a copy of the policy might enforce this policy without regard to it
provisions . . ."Id. at 503.
Cases from other jurisdiction declare that an insured has an obligation to read the
policy of insurance. As an example, in Hunton v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America 243
F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D. Texas 2001), the plaintiff alleged he bought a life policy which
would only require premium payments for a fixed number of years, and the sales agent
represented that the policy would so provide. Although the insured claimed
misrepresentation, the court held that under Texas law, "an insured has a duty to read the
insurance policy and is charged with knowledge of its provisions." Id at 706. The court
held that, "Friedman's [the sales agent's] oral representations cannot as a mater of law
override the written contract terms." Id. at 707. Even with respect to a claim of
fraudulent inducement, the court held, "Nevertheless, even a cursory review of the Policy
and Application informs Plaintiffs that Friedman's oral representations did not accurately
reflect the written Policy. " Id. at 699. See also Rutz v. Government Employees Ins. Co.
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4 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App 1999) (An insured has a duty to read the policy and failing
to do so, is charged with knowledge of the policy terms and conditions).
In Hartford Ins. Co. of the Southeast v Franklin, 424 S.E. 2d 803 (Ga. 1992) the
court considered pre-policy representations as to what the extent of coverage would be.
The court stated, citing prior precedent, "We declined to apply the doctrine of estoppel
because the insured was under a duty to read and examine the policy and to reject it as
unacceptable or renegotiate it if the coverage the insured sought was not provided in the
policy." Id. at 805.
See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ben Lewis Plumbing, Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc. 710 A.2d 338 (Md. 1998) (recognizing a duty to read the policy of
insurance in the face of misrepresentation and estoppel claims); Sophie v. Lincoln
National Life Ins. Co. F. Supp.Lexis 14861 (N.D. 111. 1997) (The plaintiffs had the means
to ascertain the true facts as to the extent of any coverage where names of phone numbers
of persons existed, to call regarding extent of coverage).
Even where courts recognize estoppel in relation to insurance policies, the courts
hold that there is not reasonable reliance justifying estoppel where the insured has but
does not read the policy. See, e.g. Leibman v. Prudential Financial, Inc. F. Supp., 20
Lexis 21048 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (Applying New Jersey law which recognized equitable
estoppel regarding pre-policy representations, however, "where policy terms are clearly
worded and conspicuously displayed, an insured may not avoid policy terms based on her
failure to read or understand the policy."); Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d
1202 (D.C. Ct. App. 1999) (Notwithstanding representation made by State Farm's agent,
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the doctrines of equitable estoppel and reformation do not apply where the language of
the policy is clear);
In the present case, the insured received a copy of the policy. Facts, above, para.
20. The concerns of the dissent in Martinez, above, remain under the facts of this case,
that is, enforcement of the policy without regard to its provisions. And the concerns of
the majority in Martinez disappear. Youngblood had the opportunity to read the policy.
It was available for him to determine the extent of coverage. He was even warned, in
bold capital letters, to read the Policy carefully. Facts, above, para. 21. The policy
language concerning UIM coverage applying only if he were a motorist, is clear and
unambiguous. See Facts above, paras. 17-18. If any provisions were not clear, he could
have sought clarification. As a result, estoppel should not be applied to the facts at bar to
allow coverage never intended or expected or accounted for by the insured.
POINT VI
THE HARR CASE RELIED UPON BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
GREATLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CASE AT BAR
In its decision in this case, the panel of the Court of Appeals, in the face of cases
to the contrary stated, "We are particularly persuaded by the reasoning of Harr v. Allstate
Insurance Co, 54 N.J. 287, 255 A. 2d 208 (N.J. 1969). . . "Youngblood, 2005 UT App
154, PI8. However, several very significant differences make one believe that even the
New Jersey court in Harr would rule differently under the present facts.
First, the person making the representations concerning coverage in Harr was an
employee/agent of the defendant insurer not an independent contractor as is the case at
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bar (see Facts, above, para. 7). The court in Harr stated: "It is our understanding that
defendant does not write insurance through so-called 'independent' agents but rather does
business only by its own employees. Consequently we assume Meinsohn [the agent] was
defendant's employee." Harr at 211, nl. Also, the court recognized, and apparently felt
it important that, w*it was stipulated" that Meinsohn was defendant's agent. Id. at 211.
For i\\z reasons why it should make a significant difference whether the agent was an
independent contractor or an employee, see Point II, above.
Second, in Harr, the day before the plaintiff was going on vacation, plaintiff called
the agent to specifically enquire if the merchandise in his basement could be covered for
up to $15,000. Id. at 212. The agent said he would have to check and would call Harr
back. Id. at 212. The agent called back saying, "Mr. Harr, we can cover you for $7,500
and you axe fully covered. Go to Florida and have a good time." Id. at 212. (Emphasis in
the original). The actions of the agent in Harr were in the nature of a binder. The trip
was in the middle of January and the loss occurred in February. Id. at 211. Insurance
agents can bind their principles. It is not unusual for a person to call an agent and ask for
a binder, for example, when a person buys a new car. The case at bar is not similar to a
binder-type representation as in Harr.
Third, the plaintiff in Harr did not receive the contract regarding the new
coverage: "Harr did not receive the contract. . . before he left for Florida, but testified he
took Meinsohn's word that he was folly covered." Id. at 212. He read it later, but it is
unclear whether it arrived before the loss: "He was not asked if he read it before or after
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he learned of the water damage." Id. at 212 and 221. In the present case, Mr.
Youngblood received the policy well before the loss. Facts, above, para. 20.
Fourth, the 1963 Harr policy was "confusing and abstruse." Id. at 212. For a
lengthy discussion of the confusion see pages 212-213. The policy at issue is not
confusing but clear and simply worded. See Facts, above, paras. 17-18, 23.
Fifth, concerning "the element of reliance," the New Jersey court held that Mr.
Harr relied on the statement of the agent that he was fully covered, which "demonstrates
sufficient reliance at least until the written contract reached him and he had a reasonable
opportunity to examine it." Id. at 220. (Emphasis added). That language implies that
even the New Jersey court, upon which the Court of Appeals relied in the case at bar,
may not allow estoppel if the insured has received a copy of the policy and has had
opportunity to read it. The Harr court found the policy so confusing that even if Mr.
Harr had received it prior to the loss, he was excused in that regard; "he will only be held
to that to which he would be alerted thereby [by a review of the policy]." Id. at 221.
See a later New Jersey case, Martinez v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 367
A.2d 904 (N.J. 1976) which notes the general rule that insureds are charged with
knowledge of their contracts, with some exceptions.
in the present case, because the sales agent was an independent contractor, the
circumstances were not similar to a binder, Youngblood had received a copy of the
Policy before the loss, the language of the policy was not obscure and abstruse, and there
was no reasonable reliance, this court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the
Summary Judgments granted by the trial court.
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Although Harr is clearly distinguishable, it is admitted, that the court in Harr did
state that equitable estoppel is available under proper circumstances regarding coverage,
as did the other cases cited by the Court of Appeals panel in this case. However, this is
not one of those proper cases where estoppel should be allow even under those other
states' cases.
POINT VII
PLAINTIFF DID NOT REASONABLY RELY ON THE STATEMENTS
OF THE COTTONWOOD INSURANCE AGENCY'S SALES PERSON.
One of the elements of estoppel, even where it is applied to insurance coverage, is
reasonable reliance. Even if this Court would allow estoppel to create non-existent
coverage, Youngblood did not reasonably rely on the statements of the Cottonwood
Insurance agent for the following reasons: (1) Youngblood did not allege any such
representations and reliance thereon in his Amended Complaint, estoppel should not
apply under such circumstances, (2) factually Youngblood felt the examples regarding
him as a pedestrian or sitting at his desk were lame, (3) he questionably declared he relied
thereon in his deposition when specifically asked if he did, stating he wanted his cars
covered; (4) the examples did not make sense that underinsured "motorist" coverage
UIM would exist for the examples given by the Cottonwood agent such as sitting at his
desk, (5) this Court should not consider reliance on oral examples of an independent
agent reasonable when Youngblood had the ability to determine precisely what the
coverage was by reading the Policy which he was supplied, (6) the Policy cover sheet
warned Youngblood to read the Policy carefully and rely thereon because it set out the
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agreement between insured and insurer. Each of the above will be discussed under
separate heading below.
(1) Youngblood did not allege any such representations or reliance thereon in his
Amended Complaint. Estoppel should not apply under such circumstances. See Point I,
above.
(2) Factually, Youngblood felt the examples regarding him as a pedestrian or
sitting at his desk were lame. In his deposition, Youngblood stated that the examples of
the Cottonwood agent concerning pedestrians and sitting at his desk were lame, thus
implying he did not give them credence, did not rely on them.
To result in estoppel, reliance must be reasonable. It is not reasonable to rely on
lame examples.
A failure to demonstrate that the independent agent promised specific coverage as
opposed to giving some lame examples, should not justify reliance or estoppel.
(3) Youngblood questionably declared that he relied thereon in his deposition
when specifically asked if he did, stating he wanted his cars covered;
Youngblood was specifically asked if he relied on such lame examples. He did
say, '"Well, yesv, but continued that he really wanted his good cars covered. Facts,
above, para. 12. Such questionable reliance, is not reasonable reliance, is not justifiable
reliance.
(4) The examples did not make sense that underinsured motorist coverage would
exist for the examples given by the Cottonwood agent such as sitting at his desk.
Reliance must be reasonable. It is unreasonable that underinsured "motorist" coverage
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would exist or be an important protection for the plaintiff sitting at his desk. (Facts,
above, para. 10). Any reliance on such examples, recognized by the Youngblood as
lame, is unreasonable.
(5) This Court should not consider reliance on oral examples of an independent
agent reasonable to provide non-existent coverage, when Youngblood had the ability to
determine precisely what the coverage was by reading the Policy which he was supplied.
The agent involved in the sale of the insurance was with Cottonwood Insurance Agency.
Facts, above, para. 7. An insured should not be found to have reasonably relied upon an
independent agent's questionable, lame examples, to bind an insurer, where the Policy is
sent to the insured, and he/she has opportunity to read it. The Insurer's written
expression of coverage, should be reasonably relied upon, not some example by an
independent agent.
(6) the Policy cover sheet warned the Youngblood to read the Policy carefully and
rely thereon because it set out the agreement between insured and insurer. The cover to
the Policy warned Youngblood in capitalized, bold letters, to read the policy carefully
because it contained the rights and obligations of the parties. Facts, above, para. 21. The
language is clear and simple. Youngblood is warned thereby that even the brief outline in
the cover sheet, which came from the insurer itself as opposed to an independent sales'
agent, should not be relied upon, because only the Policy contains the rights and
obligations of the parties. Facts, above para. 21. In the face of such a warning, reliance
on the lame examples of an independent sales agent should be unreasonable as a matter
of law.
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POINT VIII
EVEN WHERE THE PRE-CONTRACT REPRESENTATIONS ARE IN
WRITING, COURTS OFTEN REFUSE TO APPLY ESTOPPEL TO
EXPANCD COVERAGE; BUT IF THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE
ESTOPPEL TO EXPAND COVERAGE, IT SHOULD ONLY BE
ALLOW UNDER RELIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES
In Couch on Insurance 3d (2005), estoppel is declared not well recognized even
where written promotional materials contain representations:
"With the exception of group insurance policies, . . . a prospectus,
pamphlet, schedule, or illustration which is not attached or referred
to in the policy does not generally form apart of the contract, and is
not binding on the insurer. However, the facts may be such that a
different conclusions is warranted. For example, knowingly false
statements and in a pamphlet or advertisement have rendered the
company responsible for such statements liable to one who relied
upon them."
Id.dX 18:19. Couch continues:
"There is greater justification for regarding the prospectus,
pamphlet, schedule, or illustration as part of the contract where it is referred
to in the policy or attached to it.
Id. at 18:19. Couch recognizes that there are cases to the contrary.
In the present case, the alleged statements by the independent agent were, at the
very best, in the nature of an illustration, and should not result in estoppel.
Although this court should not allow estoppel to expand coverage beyond that
which is expected by the insurer, if the court does, it should only do so under very limited
circumstances which by themselves have indicia of reliability. Because it is so easy for a
plaintiff, who is seeking recovery, to assert that a sales person made representations
which would allow the plaintiff to recover large amounts of money for risks not covered

34

in a policy, if estoppel is allow to expand coverage beyond that which is expected in the
policy, it should be allow only under very narrow circumstances.
With respect to estoppel against a governmental entity this court, for example,
provides that no such estoppel will lie unless the representations are established in
writing. See, Celebrity Club, Inc. v Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah
1979); Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992).
Only if this Court is inclined to allow estoppel to expand coverage, such a
requirement as a written representation should be adopted in the case of insurance as in
the case of governmental entities, to ensure reliability in the face of easy allegations of
oral statements of coverage which a plaintiff hopes to expand.
Some state courts will allow estoppel to expand coverage if the pre-policy
representations were made in writing authorized by the insurer. For example, Marlin v.
Wetzel County Board of Education, 569 S.E.2d 462 (W.Va. 2002) (misrepresentations in
writing through a certificate of insurance could result in estoppel to deny lack of
coverage); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 305 F. 2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962) (Where the
insurer issued a written certificate of insurance which reasonably led the insured to
believe coverage existed, insurer was estopped to deny coverage); Farmers Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Bechard 122 N.W. 2d 86 (S.D. 1963) (misrepresentations in writing resulted
in estoppel).
If this court should recognize estoppel to expand coverage, which Auto-owners
declares it should not do, at the very least, it should only be applied where the alleged
representations are in writing, directly from the insurer as opposed to an independent
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contractor, and clearly misrepresent coverage not in the policy. Generalities should not
suffice, and misrepresentations must be specific as to specific coverage. Also some
courts require that any misrepresentations must be knowingly false, akin to fraud, or there
must be a higher than normal standard of proof Such safeguards should be adopted if
estoppel is recognized to expand coverage.
CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment granted by the trial court should be affirmed in favor of
Auto-owners, and the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed.
DATED this <S^day of August, 2005.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

KbBERT R. WALLACE
Attorney for Defendant - Appellee
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[ * * * 1 ] Third District, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable William B.
CASE SUMMARY

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant insured challenged a decision of the Third District,
Salt Lake Department (Utah), which granted summary judgment in favor of appellee
insurer in connection with the insured's claims of equitable estoppel and bad faith.
OVERVIEW: The insured purchased an automobile insurance policy from the insurer.
The insured was struck by an automobile while walking in a parking lot. He sought
underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer in this action. The trial court ruled in
the insurer's favor, but the court reversed. The court adopted the view that estoppel
could not generally be used to extend the terms of an insurance contract, but estoppel
could bar an insurer's defense of noncoverage in the limited circumstances when an
insurance agent made material misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at
the inception of the contract and the prospective insured reasonably relied upon such
misrepresentations in purchasing the policy. In this case, the insured testified that an
agent of the insurer misrepresented the scope of the policy before it was purchased.
Based on this, the insured showed a disputed issue of fact as to whether material
misrepresentations were made to him by the agent before he entered the contract.
There was also an issue as to whether the insured reasonably relied on the
representations made. A remand was necessary.
OUTCOME: The court reversed and remanded.
CORE TERMS: coverage, insured, misrepresentation, insurer, estoppel, reasonably relied,
estopped, inception, insurance contract, insurance policy, purchasing, summary judgment,
insurance agent, denying coverage, equitable estoppel, doctrine of estoppel, purchaser,
insurance coverage, misrepresented, deposition testimony, misrepresents, pedestrian,
prospective purchaser, expressly excluded, estopped to deny, written policy, life insurance,
detriment, broaden, granting summary judgment
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards of Review %±1
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard
H/VI

±Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court

views all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and reviews the trial court's conclusions of law
for correctness.

More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel
w/V2

±Utah courts define equitable estoppel as conduct by one party which leads another
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Defenses > Fraud & Misrepresentation %D
H/v3

±Utah courts have held that for a claim of misrepresentation to modify a contract, it
is not essential that the party making the representations knew that they were
false, if they were in fact false and material, and the other party had a right to rely
thereon, and did so. Thus, to escape the language of a contract, there must be a
false and material statement made before the contract is consummated and the
plaintiff must have reasonably relied upon such statement. More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation

HN4+tother jurisdictions hold that an insurer may be estopped from asserting particular
policy provisions, even though the effect may be to bring within the coverage of the
policy risks not covered by its terms, when an insurance agent misrepresents the
coverage of the insurance contract and where the insured reasonably relies on the
misrepresentation when purchasing the insurance. The Court of Appeals of Utah is
persuaded by this View.

More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract

€l

Formation Si

HN5

±Equitable estoppel is available to broaden insurance coverage and estoppel may bar
the insurance company's defense of noncoverage where the insurance company
agent made misrepresentations before the contract was executed and the
purchaser reasonably relied on those misrepresentations in purchasing the
policy.

More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation ^
HN6

t

±\Nhere an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though innocently, the coverage
of an insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom, to an insured before or at the
inception of the contract, and the insured reasonably relies thereupon to his
ultimate detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk
or from a peril actually not covered by the terms of the policy. The proposition is
one of elementary and simple justice and by justifiably relying on the insurer's
superior knowledge, the insured has been prevented from procuring the desired
coverage elsewhere. To reject this approach because a new contract is thereby
made for the parties would be an unfortunate triumph of form over
substance.

More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel L*iu
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation k*ijy
HN7

±Estoppel may be used to expand the terms of a policy when the agent
misrepresents the coverage of the insurance contract before or at its inception and
where the insured reasonably relies. While estoppel cannot be invoked to create
coverage clearly excluded by a written contract of insurance, the concept may be
utilized against an insurer when its conduct has been such as to induce action in

r e l i a n c e on it.

More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel *J3
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation -*J3
Hyvs

±An insurer may be estopped from denying coverage when the insurer's agent
makes oral misrepresentations regarding the coverage provided by the policy and
the purchaser reasonably relies on such misrepresentations. It is true that courts in
Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not read their insurance
policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so because the policies are
unreadable, have held that the agent's oral representations at the time of sale can
override the written terms of the policy. If the agent insists to the prospective
purchaser that the policy will insure against a hazard that the prospective
purchaser is particularly concerned about, and the hazard materializes, the
company may be estopped to plead the terms of the policy because the strength of
the agent's oral assurances lulled the prospective purchaser into not reading, or
reading inattentively, dense and rebarbative policy language. More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel -*yJ
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation k«3
H/v9

±The Court of Appeals of Utah adopts the view that estoppel may not generally be
used to extend the terms of an insurance contract. However, estoppel may bar an
insurer's defense of noncoverage in the limited circumstances when an insurance
agent makes material misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at the
inception of the contract and the prospective insured reasonably relies upon such
misrepresentations in purchasing the insurance. More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel k*3
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation %&
H/vl0

± T h e second key requirement for equitable estoppel to apply to modify an
insurance contract is reasonable reliance upon the precontract misrepresentations.
Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case,
and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Although it is impossible to
draw precise legal boundaries of when reliance is reasonable, the courts have
given some direction. Generally, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under the
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and
intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that
he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. A
plaintiff who fails to read a contract without fault on the part of the defendant
generally is found not to have reasonably relied. Where there is nothing said or
done which would be reasonably calculated to disarm a reasonably prudent person
so that he would sign the contract without reading it and in the absence of some
act or artifice in inducing the other part to refrain from reading the contract, relief
from the f r a u d is Often d e n i e d . More Like This Headnote

Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation
HN11

±Regarding estoppel and an insurance contract formation, the rule set forth is a
narrow one and applies only in limited circumstances. The representations must
be clear and material and must be made in an attempt to induce the potential
insured to enter into the contract. The representations must lead the potential
insured to feel as though he or she need not read the contract, and the
representations must be of the type that a reasonable person would rely
upon.

More Like This Headnote

COUNSEL: Peter C. Collins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Robert R. Wallace, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
JUDGES: BILLINGS, Presiding Judge. WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Gregory K.
Orme, Judge
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings
OPINION:
[ * * 8 3 0 ] BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
[*P1] Robert L. Youngblood II appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment
to Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) on Youngblood's claims of equitable
estoppel and bad faith. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
[ * P 2 ] Youngblood, the president and sole owner of Youngblood Home Improvement, Inc.,
purchased an auto insurance policy (the Policy) from Auto-Owners for his business. The
Policy contained coverage for certain specifically designated motor vehicles, and
underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage if those vehicles were involved in an accident with an
underinsured motorist. The Policy provided UIM coverage of $ 300,000 per person.
[ * P 3 ] Youngblood never read the Policy, which provided that Auto-Owners "will pay
compensatory damages [that the [ * * * 2 ] named insured is] legally entitled to recover. . .
from the owner or operator of any underinsured automobile . . . for bodily injury [the named
insured] sustains . . . when [the named insured is] a pedestrian."
[*P4] When Youngblood purchased the Policy, he spoke with an Auto-Owners insurance
agent. According to Youngblood's deposition testimony, the agent made representations
which Youngblood relied upon in purchasing [ * * 8 3 1 ] the Policy. Specifically, Youngblood
testified that the agent
gave me a scenario . . . probably just a scare tactic. He said . . . 'the reason you
have [UIM and uninsured motorist coverage] is you have to protect your family.1
And he said 'if you're walking down the street, you've got nothing if you . . . don't
have underinsured and uninsured motorist and somebody runs you over. You
could be sitting at your desk or walking down the street and if you don't have the
coverage, you've got nothing.'

[*P5] Youngblood testified that the agent went on to tell him that "'the only thing I would
recommend, other than [the UIM coverage] is to get some kind of wage protection . . . at the
very least you should buy underinsured motorist and uninsured [ * * * 3 ] motorist because
there are a lot of people out there . . . that don't carry insurance at all.'" Youngblood testified
that he relied on these statements because the agents were "selling a lot of insurance and
knew what they were doing." Finally, at the time of purchasing the Policy, Youngblood
testified that no Auto-Owners agent told him that because the Policy was a corporate policy it
would not cover Youngblood personally should he become the victim of a pedestrian accident.

[*P6] After purchasing the Policy, on December 30, 1997, Youngblood was walking across
a parking lot toward a medical office when he was struck by an automobile driven by Rachel
Cooksey. Cooksey had $ 50,000 available in liability insurance. Youngblood settled with
Cooksey for her policy limits, however, he alleges that hospital bills for his injuries sustained
as a result of the accident exceed $ 50,000.
[*P7] Prior to settling with Cooksey, Youngblood asked Auto-Owners to waive its
subrogation rights to ensure that settlement would not jeopardize his entitlement to UIM
benefits under the Policy. Auto-Owners agreed to do so and Youngblood executed a release
and settlement agreement to Cooksey in exchange [ * * * 4 ] for the $ 50,000 liability
insurance. Youngblood sent Auto-Owners a copy of the release along with documents
evidencing Youngblood's damages and a UIM settlement demand.
[*P8] On January 5, 2002, Auto-Owners sent Youngblood a letter which first recognized
that Youngblood was the insured under the Policy and then stated "we have determined this
claim will be honored." However, on March 11, 2002, Auto-Owners sent Youngblood a letter
stating that "further review of the coverage" had caused Auto-Owners to take the position
that because Youngblood was not occupying the insured vehicle, "there is no coverage
afforded to him for this loss and we will defend based on this issue."
[*P9] Youngblood brought suit against Auto-Owners alleging that he was entitled to UIM
benefits and that Auto-Owners breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. After limited
discovery, Auto-Owners filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted.
Youngblood appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[ * P 1 0 ] Youngblood argues that the trial court erred in granting Auto-Owners's motion for
summary judgment. H/VI 7Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine
issues of [ * * * 5 ] material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all
facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. See
Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130, P13, 63 P.3d 705.
ANALYSIS
[ * P 1 1 ] Youngblood argues that the trial court erred in granting Auto-Owners's motion for
summary judgment relying on Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125
fUtah Ct. App. 1991)f and that Auto-Owners should be equitably estopped from denying
coverage where Youngblood reasonably relied on Auto-Owners's misrepresentations made
prior to his purchase of the Policy. We agree with Youngblood that the granting of summary
judgment was error.
[ * * 8 3 2 ] I. Equitable Estoppel
[ * P 1 2 ] " ^ ^ U t a h courts define equitable estoppel as "conduct by one party which leads
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." United Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 fUtah 1982). [ * * * 6 ]
[*P13] In Perkins, the case the trial court relied upon in granting summary judgment, this
court determined that an insurance company was not estopped from denying a claim for life
insurance where the policy clearly stated that coverage extended only to "active, full-time
employees." 814 P.2d at 1128. Perkins worked as a nurse for sixteen and one-half years until
she became disabled and was unable to work. See id. at 1127. Great-West Insurance

Company (Great-West) mistakenly paid medical benefits and accepted and retained
premiums on behalf of Perkins in reliance on representations made by her in an application
for health and life insurance that she worked full time. See id. Upon Perkins's death and her
husband's claim for life insurance, Great-West denied the claim on the basis that Perkins was
never eligible for insurance coverage because she did not work full time. See id. at 1128. We
determined that estoppel could not be used to extend coverage to risks not covered by the
express terms of the policy. See id. at 1130-31. Moreover, "given Mrs. Perkins'[s] failure to
learn the terms of her insurance policy, [ * * * 7 ] her reliance thereon was not reasonable."
Id. at 1131.
[ * P 1 4 ] Simply put, Perkins does not present a similar factual scenario as the instant case.
Youngblood's deposition testimony alleges that an Auto-Owners agent misrepresented the
scope of the Policy before it was purchased. In Perkins, there were no representations made
by Great-West as to coverage, rather Great-West mistakenly paid benefits and accepted
premiums based on Perkins's inaccurate application indicating she was a full-time employee.
See id. at 1127. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on
Perkins, n l
Footnotes

n l In Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), we
noted that a "great majority of states dealing with the doctrine of estoppel have held that it
cannot be used to bring risks which were not covered by the terms of the policy within
coverage of the policy." Id. at 1131 (citing numerous cases standing for this proposition).
However, the cases cited are all factually distinct from the instant case in that none deal with
misrepresentations before the insurance policy was purchased.

End Footnotes

[***8]

[ * P 1 5 ] This is a case of first impression in Utah. Utah courts have never dealt with the
doctrine of estoppel in an insurance coverage case where an insurance agent allegedly made
material misrepresentations as to coverage before a policy was purchased. However, HN3
*Utah courts have held that for a claim of misrepresentation to modify a contract, it is not
essential that the party making the representations knew that they were false, if they were in
fact false and material, and the other party had a right to rely thereon, and did so. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 580, 585 (1912). Thus, to escape the
language of a contract, there must be a false and material statement made before the
contract is consummated and the plaintiff must have reasonably relied upon such statement.
[*P16] Turning to other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority as to whether in some
circumstances equitable estoppel may be utilized to modify the terms of an insurance policy.
Some jurisdictions hold that the doctrine of estoppel may not be used to expand an insurance
policy's coverage to include risks that the policy specifically excludes. See, [ * * * 9 ] e.g.,
Nicholls v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1157 (D. Colo. 2003) (stating
under Colorado law, "the doctrine of estoppel cannot, based upon conduct of insurer, bring
within coverage of [the] insurance policy risks not covered by its terms or risks expressly
excluded from the policy"); Harasyn v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 349 Ark. 9, 75 S.W.3d
696, 702 (Ark. 2002) (holding that the doctrine of waiver or estoppel cannot be given the
effect of enlarging or extending the coverage as defined in the contract); Ouillian v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'v, 61 Ga. App. 138, 6 S.E.2d 108, 112 fGa. Ct. App. 1939) (holding that
neither waiver nor estoppel was available to radically change the terms of an [ * * 8 3 3 ]
insurance policy to cover additional subject matter, causes of loss, or matters expressly
excluded from the coverage of the policy).

[*P17] HN4*+0ther jurisdictions, however, hold that an insurer may be estopped from
asserting particular policy provisions, even though the effect may be to bring within the
coverage of the policy risks not covered by its terms, when an insurance agent misrepresents
the coverage of the insurance [ * * * 1 0 ] contract and where the insured reasonably relies on
the misrepresentation when purchasing the insurance. We are persuaded by this view.
[*P18] We are particularly persuaded by the reasoning of Harr v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
54 NJ. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969), where the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned
prior state precedent in holding that " ^ ^ e q u i t a b l e estoppel was available to broaden
insurance coverage and that estoppel may bar the insurance company's defense of
noncoverage where the insurance company agent made misrepresentations before the
contract was executed and the purchaser reasonably relied on those misrepresentations in
purchasing the policy. See id. at 219. In Harr, there was evidence that the insured had relied
to his detriment on the agent's misrepresentations regarding the scope of fire insurance
coverage, as the agent told the insured that he was "fully covered" when in fact the terms of
the policy specified certain exclusions. Id. at 220. The insured did not receive a copy of the
policy, but stated that he took the agent's word that he was "fully covered" because he "felt
like [he] had confidence in him." Id. at 212. The [ * * * n ] New Jersey Supreme Court
analyzed the view that estoppel is not available to broaden coverage and noted that many
cases comprising this view "are confusing and not clear cut" because "estoppel and waiver
are often interchangeably and improperly used, and in many cases where estoppel is held
unavailable[,] the necessary elements have not been made out anyway, or the insured by
reason of his own conduct is clearly not entitled to relief." Id. at 218. The court noted that it
is more impressed by decisions proceeding

on the thesis that HN6w+where an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though
innocently, the coverage of an insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom* to
an insured before or at the inception of the contract, and the insured reasonably
relies thereupon to his ultimate detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny
coverage after a loss on a risk or from a peril actually not covered by the terms
of the policy.

Id. at 219. Finally, the court noted that "the [above stated] proposition is one of elementary
and simple justice" and "by justifiably relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the
insured has been prevented from procuring the desired [ * * * 1 2 ] coverage elsewhere." Id.
"To reject this approach because a new contract is thereby made for the parties would be an
unfortunate triumph of form over substance." Id.
[*P19] The Florida case of Peninsular Life Insurance Co. v. Wade, 425 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983^ also exemplifies the position that estoppel may be used to broaden
insurance contract coverage where the insurer makes misrepresentations before the policy is
purchased. See id. at 1183-84. In Peninsular, the Florida district court determined that the
insurer was estopped to deny full coverage on a life insurance policy, notwithstanding a clear
and unambiguous policy provision limiting coverage, where the insurer's agent held himself
out as an expert and misrepresented to the insured and his wife that the policy would provide
"full coverage" at the time of purchasing the policy and where the insured reasonably relied.
Id. When the insured read the policy a few days later and questioned the agent about a
particular provision, the agent told the insured that he was one of the few people who
understood the policy and that the policy would pay full benefits from [ * * * 1 3 ] the date of
issuance. See id. at 1182. Although the facts differ slightly from those in the case before us

because there were misrepresentations both before and after the purchasing of the policy,
the Florida court stated that it agreed with the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Harr and held that H/V7! ?estoppel may be used to expand the terms of a policy when the
agent misrepresents the coverage of the insurance contract before or at its inception and
where the insured reasonably relies. See id. at 1183-84; see Harr. 255 A.2d at [ * * 8 3 4 ]
219; see also Kramer v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc, 436 So. 2d 935. 937 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (quoting Peninsular and stating that the doctrine that waiver and estoppel are not
available to extend coverage of insurance policy is not applied without exception; when a
insurance agent misrepresents coverage before or at the inception of the contract and the
insured reasonably relies, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage). The court in Peninsular
went on to state that "while estoppel cannot be invoked to create coverage clearly excluded
by a written contract of insurance, [ * * * 1 4 ] the concept may be utilized against an insurer
when its conduct has been such as to induce action in reliance on it." 425 So. 2d at 1184
(quoting Burns v. Consolidated Am. Ins. Co.. 359 So. 2d 1203. 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
[ * P 2 0 ] Indiana has also adopted the rule that H / v s ?an insurer may be estopped from
denying coverage when the insurer's agent makes oral misrepresentations regarding the
coverage provided by the policy and the purchaser reasonably relies on such
misrepresentations. See Village Furniture. Inc. v. Associated Ins. Managers. Inc.. 541 N.E.2d
306. 308 find. Ct. App. 1989). In Village Furniture, the court stated,

It is true that courts in Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not
read their insurance policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so
because the policies are unreadable, have held that the agent's oral
representations at the time of sale can override the written terms of the policy. If
the agent insists to the prospective purchaser that the policy will insure against a
hazard that the prospective purchaser] is particularly concerned about, and the
hazard materializes, [ * * * 1 5 ] the company may be estopped to plead the
terms of the policy because the strength of the agent's oral assurances lulled the
prospective purchaser] into not reading, or reading inattentively, dense and
rebarbative policy language.

Id. (citations and alterations omitted); see also American Family Mut Ins. Co. v. Jeffery,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225. at *16, 28 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 11, 2000) (holding the insurer was
estopped from denying coverage where agent told prospective purchaser that policy would
cover "anything to do with" prospective purchaser's business including use of dump trucks, in
clear contradiction to written policy which excludes such coverage and where prospective
purchaser reasonably relied). n2
Footnotes

n2 Numerous other jurisdictions have also held that estoppel may bar the insurer's denial of
coverage when misrepresentations were made before or at the inception of the insurance
contract and where the prospective insured reasonably relied on those misrepresentations.
See, e.g., United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Meyer. 305 F.2d 107. 113 f9th Cir. 1962) (applying Idaho
law and holding "that an insurance company may, through the conduct of its agents, be held
liable for the coverage of the personal liability of a person not only not named as an insured
in a policy, but actually expressly excluded by the terms of the written policy"); Ivey v.

United Nat'l Indem. Co., 259 F.2d 205, 208 f9th Cir. 1958) (holding that under California
law, "an insurance company may by its conduct or dealings apart from the policy itself be
estopped from denying . . . coverage . . . [when] the insured has been led to believe [it] is
protected under the policy"); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dakota Rose, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1087 (D. S.D. 1999) (holding under South Dakota law, conduct of insurer giving rise to
estoppel to deny coverage must occur before or at inception of policy and must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence); County Forest Prod, v. Green Mountain Agency, Inc., 2000
ME 161, 758 A.2d 59, 66 fMe. 2000) (holding insurer was estopped from denying the
increase in policy limits because insurer misrepresented to insured that an increase in policy
limits would be "no problem"); Allstate Ins. Co v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 67 Ore.
App. 623, 679 P.2d 879, 882 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that insurance company estopped
from denying coverage where insured's son reasonably relied on agent's representation that
son's auto was covered at inception of new policy to cover son); Barth v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (holding
representations in brochure given before the contract was purchased, if reasonably relied
upon, may be considered terms of the contract); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Contracting
& Towing Co., 301 S.C. 418, 392 S.E.2d 460, 462 fS.C. 1990) (holding "the scope of risk
under an insurance policy may be extended by estoppel if the insurer has misled the insured
into believing the particular risk is within the coverage"); State Auto. Cas. Underwriters v.
Ruotsalainen, 81 S.D. 472, 136 N.W.2d 884r 887 (S.D. 1965) (holding insurer was estopped
from denying coverage where agent assured insured that policy covered liability arising out
of use of trailer); Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Bechard, 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W.2d 86, 92
(S.D. 1963) (allowing oral representations of insurance agent to limit exclusions in written
policy); Marlin v. Wetzel County Bd. of Educ, 212 W. Va. 215, 569 S.E.2d 462, 472 (W. Va.
2002) (holding that "exceptions to the general rule that the doctrine of estoppel may not be
used to extend insurance coverage beyond the terms of an insurance contract, include, but
are not necessarily limited to, instances where an insured has been prejudiced because: (1)
an insurer's, or its agent's, misrepresentation made at the policy's inception resulted in the
insured being prohibited from procuring the coverage he or she desired").

End Footnotes

[***16]

[ * * 8 3 5 ] [*P21] H/V9"?We adopt the view that estoppel may not generally be used to
extend the terms of an insurance contract. However, we hold that estoppel may bar an
insurer's defense of noncoverage in the limited circumstances when an insurance agent
makes material misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at the inception of the
contract and the prospective insured reasonably relies upon such misrepresentations in
purchasing the insurance.
[*P22] Based on Youngblood's deposition testimony and affidavit, he has shown at the
least that there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether material misrepresentations
were made to him by an insurance agent before he entered into the contract. n3
Footnotes

n3 Youngblood also argues that Auto-Owners should be estopped from denying coverage
because of misrepresentations that occurred after the inception of the contract. We agree
with the trial court that Perkins controls any postcontract alleged misrepresentations.

End Footnotes
[ * P 2 3 ] HN1(r7The second key requirement for [ * * * 1 7 ] equitable estoppel to apply to
modify an insurance contract is reasonable reliance upon the precontract misrepresentations.

"Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is
usually a question for the jury to determine." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d
634, 638 fUtah Ct. App. 1987). "Although it is impossible to draw precise legal boundaries of
when reliance is reasonable . . . the courts have given some direction." Id.
[ * P 2 4 ] "Generally, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without
independent investigation." Id. "It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should
make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered something
which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make
his own investigation." Id. A plaintiff who fails to read a contract without fault on the part of
the defendant generally is found not to have reasonably relied. See id. The Utah Supreme
Court explained in Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945), where there is
nothing

said or done [ * * * 1 8 ] which would be reasonably calculated to disarm a
reasonably prudent person so that he would sign the contract without reading it
and in the absence of some act or artifice in inducing the other part to refrain
from reading the contract[,] relief from the fraud is often denied.

Id. at 137.
[ * P 2 5 ] In Conder, the plaintiff, Conder alleged that during the course of several
conversations with the defendant's agents regarding prospective employment with the
defendant company, the agents fraudulently misrepresented the nature of their business and
employment opportunities that Conder would have by working for the defendant. See 739
P.2d at 636. Relying upon those statements, Conder alleged that he terminated his former
employment and was induced to work as an agent of the defendant, suffering various
damages. See id. We determined that "we cannot say as a matter of law that Conder was
unreasonable in his reliance on the alleged misrepresentations" made by the agents, id. at
638-39, because "a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without
independent investigation." Id. at 639. Moreover, [ * * * 1 9 ] Conder did not have the
knowledge, nor did he discover anything to serve as a warning sign that he was being
deceived, which would require him to make an investigation of his own. See id. We
determined that although Conder subsequently entered into a contract expressly limiting his
employment opportunities, "Conder's affidavit alleges that he was relying on the verbal
representations of [the defendants] . . . thereby indicating that the contradictory written
provision was of no effect." Id.
[*P26] In the instant case, based on Youngblood's deposition testimony and affidavit,
there is again at least a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Youngblood reasonably
relied on the representations made by Auto-Owners's agent. Furthermore, the Policy, even if
read by Youngblood, is not particularly clear as to whether he would receive UIM coverage as
a pedestrian. n4 This further boosts his subjective claim that he reasonably relied on the
agent's assertions.
Footnotes
n4 The Policy is confusing and does not make clear that Youngblood would not be covered as
a pedestrian in an accident because the Policy was purchased in the company name rather

than in his own.

End Footnotes

[***20]

[ * P 2 7 ] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Moreover, we emphasize that HNllm+the rule we
have set forth is a narrow one and applies only in limited circumstances. The representations
must be clear and material and must be made in an attempt to induce the potential insured
to enter into the contract. The representations must lead the potential insured to feel as
though he or she need not read the contract, and the representations must be of the type
that a reasonable person would rely upon.
CONCLUSION
[ * P 2 8 ] We determine that the trial court erred by granting Auto-Owners's motion for
summary judgment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. We remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. n5
Footnotes

n5 We do not reach the remaining issues on appeal because of our disposition.

End Footnotes

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
[*P29] WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD, E,
Plaintiff,

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDMENT

Judge William B. Bohling
Civil No. 010911647PI

Defendant(s).

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on January 5,2004. The
plaintiff was represented by Peter Collins. The defendant was represented by Robert R. Wallace.
The court heard oral argument, and read the memoranda on file with respect to this motion. The
court finds that the insurance policy at issue is clear and unambiguous and that underinsured
coverage does not exist for the auto-pedestrian accident at issue. The court further finds that
estoppel does not apply, and that the case of Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company, 814
P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991) controls on issues in this case. The court concurs in arguments of
the defense, therefore:

£*t

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff on all claims, and all claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Dated and entered this ^ ' day of January 2004.

Judge William Bohling
State District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Peter Collins

iSf
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DESCRIPTION OF ITEM INSURED
Hired

SYMBOL/COST

Automobiles
Salt

COVERAGES

Combined

TERRITORY

002
Lake C o u n t y ,

LIMITS

$ 300,000

Liability

CLASS/PG

SPL
UT

PREMIUM

occurrence

CHANGE

$30.23
TOTAL

$30.23
No C h a r g e

Additional

Forms For T h i s

PREMIUM BASIS:

Item:

79521

(06-92)

79539

(06-92)

Estimated cost of h i r e - l i a b i l i t y $ I f Any

150
Employers Non-Ownership

Liab.

1-25

employees
Salt

LIMITS

COVERAGES

Combined

002
Lake C o u n t y ,

$ 300,000

Liability

SPL
UT

PREMIUM

occurrence

CHANGE

$22.00
TOTAL

$22.00
No Charge

Additional Forms For This Item:

79503

(06-92)

79539

(06-92)

150

1. 1978 GMC DUMP TRK
VIN: TCE628V602271

$7,916
002
Salt Lake County, UT
LIMITS
$ 300,000 occurrence

COVERAGES
Combined Liability
Residual Uninsured
Motorist
Underinsured Motorist
Personal Injury
Protection
Comprehensive
Collision

PREMIUM
$318.00

$ 300,000 person/$ 300,000 occurrence
$ 300,000 person/$ 300,000 occurrence

9.00
24.00

$
3,000 person
Actual Cash Value - $1000 deductible
Actual Cash Value - $1000 deductible

6.00
13.00
14.00

TOTAL

CHANGE

$384.00
No Charge

Interested Parties:

None

Additional Forms For This Item:
79365 (01-97)
79539 (06-92)

79354

(01-97)

79355

(01-97)

Premium Basis: Medium truck operated within a 100 nile radius - service use.
Gross Vehicle weight is 19,SOI.
Use Classification: Contractor - Miscellaneous.
A B'/. discount has been applied to automobiles used in contracting business.
Work Conp Discount applies.
150

79357

(01-97)
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Gross Vehicle weight is
8,000.
Use Classification: Contractor - Miscellaneous.
A BY, discount has been applied to autonobiles used in contracting business.
Work Conp Discount applies.
150

TERM
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TOTAL POLICY PREMIUM

ALL ITEMS
No Charge

Forms That Apply To All Items:
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Countersigned By:
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(06-92)
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This policy is a legal contract between you and us.
READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY. This cover sheet provides only a brief outline of some of the important features of your policy. This is not the insurance contract and only the actual policy provisions
will control. The policy itself sets forth, in detail, the rights and obligations of both you and your insurance company. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU READ YOUR POLICY.
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YOU WILL FIND
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SECTION I - DEFINITIONS

1
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2
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2
2
3
4
4
4
4
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6
6
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SECTION IV - INDIVIDUAL NAMED INSURED

8

1. LIABILITY COVERAGE

8

2. DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE

8

SECTION V - WHAT YOU MUST DO AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS

8

1. NOTIFY US PROMPTLY
2. ASSIST AND COOPERATE

8
9

3. PRESERVE OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER PAYMENTS

9

SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

9

POLICY PERIOD AND TERRITORY
CHANGES
FRAUD
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US
SEVERABILITY
DUPLICATION OF COVERAGE
ASSIGNMENT
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9
9
9
9
9
9
10

Insurance}

Life Home Car Business

INSURING AGREEMENT
he attached Declarations describe the automobile(s) we insure and the Coverages and Limits of Liability for which
ou have paid a premium. We agree to insure the described automobile(s) for those Coverages and Limits of Liability *
ubject to the terms and conditions of this policy. In return you must pay the premium and comply with all the terms
nd conditions of this policy.

SECTION I - DEFINITIONS
o understand this policy, you must understand the meaning of the following words. These words appear in bold face
fpe whenever used in this policy and endorsements attached to this policy.
Automobile means a private passenger automobile,
a truck, truck tractor, trailer, farm implement or other land motor vehicle.

a.

that pertains to the loan, lease or rental of an
automobile to you; or

b.

that holds a person-or organization engaged in
the business of transporting property for hire
harmless for your use of your automobile over
a route or territory that person or organization
is authorized to serve by public authority.

Bodily injury means physical injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including resulting
death of that person.
Equipment means an apparatus or device permanently attached to or installed in your automobile.
Equipment includes an apparatus or device specifically for use with your automobile.
Farm implement means motorized self-propelled
farm machinery.

6.

Occurrence means an accident that results in bodily
injury or property damage and includes, as one occurrence, all continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same generally harmful conditions.

7.

Private passenger automobile means a four wheel:

Insured contract means:

a.

private passenger or station wagon type automobile; or

b.

pickup or van type automobile with a maximum
load capacity of 2,000 pounds or less not used
in the business of carrying passengers for hire.

a.

a lease of premises;

b.

a sidetrack agreement;

c.

an easement or license agreement in connection with vehicle or pedestrian private railroad crossings at grade;

8.

Property damage means damage to or destruction
of tangible property including resulting loss of use
of that property.

d.

any other easement agreement, except in connection with construction or demolition operations on or within 50 feet of a railroad;

9.

e.

an indemnification of a municipality as required
by ordinance, except in connection with work
for a municipality; or

Relative means a person who resides with you and
who is related to you by blood, marriage or
adoption. Relative includes a ward or foster child
who resides with you.

f.

10. Suit means a civil court proceeding in which damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies are alleged.

that part of any other contract or agreement
pertaining to your business under which you
assume the tort liability of another to pay damages because of bodily injury or property damage to a third person or organization, if the
contract or agreement is made before the bodily injury or property damage occurs. Tort liability means liability that would be imposed by
law in the absence of any contract or agreement.

13. Your automobile means the automobile described in
the Declarations.

An insured contract does not include that part of any
contract or agreement:

14. We, us or our means the Company providing this
insurance.

11. Trailer means a utility trailer, camping or vacation
trailer, truck trailer or semi-trailer.
12. You or your means the first named insured shown
in the Declarations and if an individual, your spouse
who resides in the same household.

1

includes your liability arising out o f o r r e sulting from use of your trailer by a person
or organization other than you.

COVERAGE
a.

Liability Coverage - Bodily Injury and Property
Damage
c.
We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage for which you become legally responsible because of or arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of your automobile as an automobile. We will pay such
damages:
(1)

on your behalf;

(2)

on behalf of any relative using your automobile;

(3)

on behalf of any other person using your
automobile with your permission; and

(4)

on behalf of any person or organization legally responsible for the use of your automobile when used by you, a relative, o r
with your permission.

Other Automobiles Covered
The Liability Coverage provided for your automobile
also
applies
to
certain
other
automobiles. It applies:
(1) to an automobile you do not own which is
temporarily used as a substitute for your
automobile. Your automobile must be out
of use because of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss o r destruction. The owner o f
the substitute automobile is not covered.
(2)

We will settle or defend, as w e consider appropriate, any claim or suit for damages covered
by this policy. We will do this at our expense,
using attorneys of our choice. This agreement
to settle or defend claims or suits ends when
we have paid the limit of our liability.
b.

to an automobile of the same type which
you acquire after the inception date of t h e
current policy t e r m if:
(a)

it replaces your automobile. You must
report the replacement automobile t o
us no later than the expiration date o f
the policy t e r m during which the automobile was acquired; or

(b)

it is an additional automobile and w e
insure all automobiles you already o w n
provided you:
1)

report the additional automobile t o
us within 30 days of delivery; and

2)

pay any required additional premiums.

Trailers
(1)

The Liability Coverage provided for your
automobile includes:
(a)

a trailer designed for use with a private
passenger automobile;

(b)

a trailer with a load capacity of 2,000
pounds or less; and

(c)

non-motorized
farm wagon;

This extension does not apply if you have
other liability insurance that applies to t h e
automobile you acquire.
EXCLUSIONS
Liability Coverage does not apply:

farm machinery or a

a.

to any person for bodily injury or property
damage arising out of or resulting from an i n tentional act of that person.

b.

to any person operating or employed by an automobile garage, repair shop, sales agency,
service station or public parking place. This
exclusion does not apply to:

while used with your automobile, whether
owned by you or someone else.
A trailer described in (1)(a) or (1)(b) above
does not have to be attached to your automobile.
(2)

Liability Coverage provided by b.(1) above
to:
(a)

(b)

your trailer designed for use with a
private passenger automobile; and
your trailer with a load capacity of 2000
pounds or less;

(1)

you;

(2)

a relative; o r

(3)

any person associated with o r employed
by you;

while using your automobile in such business.
2

d.

to any automobile while:

(1) bodily injury to a domestic employee when
workers compensation benefits are not required or available; or

(1) preparing for;
(2) practicing for; or

(2) when such liability is assumed by you under an insured contract.

(3) participating in;
any prearranged racing, speed or demolition
contest.
e.

to your automobile when used with any trailer
not covered for Liability Coverage by this policy.

f.

to your trailer when used with any automobile
not covered for Liability Coverage by this policy.
This exclusion does not apply to the coverage
provided by 1.b.(2) above.

g.

h.

i.

n.

to your employee for claims brought against"
him or her by another of your employees injured on the job.

o.

to any person or organization for bodily injury
to:
(1) an employee of that person or organization; or
(2) a spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of
the employee which results from the injury
to the employee;

to any person or organization with respect to
the loading or unloading of your automobile.
We will cover you or your employee or a lessee
or borrower of your automobile or that person's
employee.

when that injury arises out of and in the course
of employment by that person or organization.
This exclusion applies:

to any person or organization (or that person's
or organization's agents, employees or contractors) subject to the security requirements
of any motor carrier law or regulation because
of transporting property for you or for others.
This exclusion does not apply to you.

(1) whether a claim is made against such person or organization as employer or otherwise; and
(2) to any obligation to share damages with or
repay another who must pay damages because of the injury.

to liability which is assumed under any contract
or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to
such liability for damages that you:

This exclusion does not apply to liability you
have assumed under an insured contract.

(1) assumed under a contract or agreement
that is an insured contract;

p.

to bodily injury or property damage for which
insurance is available under any nuclear energy liability policy. This exclusion applies even
if the nuclear energy liability policy limits of liability are exhausted.

q.

to bodily injury or property damage for which
financial responsibility or liability insurance is
required to be maintained under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or for which
governmental indemnity is available.

r.

to liability for bodily injury or property damage
caused by war, whether declared or not declared, insurrection or any of their consequences whether or not assumed under a
contract or agreement.

(2) would have in the absence of a contract or
agreement; or
(3) assumed in a private passenger automobile
lease or rental agreement, provided you
are an individual.
j.

k.

to any person or organization for damage to
property that person or organization is transporting. This exclusion does not apply to liability you have assumed under a sidetrack
agreement.
to any person or organization for damage to
property or an automobile owned by, rented to
or in the care, custody or control of that person
or organization.

3.

COVERAGE EXTENSIONS
In addition to our limit of liability, we will also pay:

I.

to any expenses that would be payable under
any workers compensation law, unemployment
compensation or disability benefits law or under
any similar law.

a.
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premiums on appeal bonds in any suit we defend. We will not apply for or furnish such
bonds.

b.

c.

d.

for all claims of one or more persons or organizations in any one occurrence.

premiums on bonds to release attachments, but
only for bond amounts that do not exceed the
applicable limit of liability. We will not apply for
or furnish such bonds.

c.

premiums on bail bonds required because of
an accident or related traffic law violation, involving your automobile during the policy period. We will not apply for or furnish such bonds.
Our maximum payment is $250 per occurrence.

(1) automobiles shown or premiums charged
in the Declarations;
(2) claims made or suits brought;
(3) persons injured; or

interest on damages owed by you because of a
judgment in a suit we defend and accruing:

(4) automobiles involved in the occurrence.

(1) after the judgment, and until we pay, offer
or deposit in court, the amount for which
we are liable under this policy; or
(2) before the judgment, where owed by law,
but only on that part of the judgment we
pay.
e.

f.

d.

5.

expenses you, a relative or a person using your
automobile with your permission, incur for first
aid to others at the time of an occurrence covered by this policy.

While your automobile is subject to laws of anothler
state or Canada, we will:
a.

increase the Limit of Liability for Liability Coverage to comply with the minimum requirements
of a financial
responsibility
or
compulsory insurance law of the jurisdiction
where your automobile is being operated; and

b.

afford the minimum amounts for the types of
mandatory coverages required by the jurisdiction where your automobile is being operated.

all other reasonable expenses incurred at our
request, including actual loss of earnings up to
$100.00 per day.

We will pay damages for bodily injury or property
damage up to the Limit of Liability stated in the
Declarations as follows:

This provision does not apply to any limits required
by any law governing motor carriers of property or
passengers.

Under bodily injury.
(1) The limit stated for "each person" is the
amount of coverage and the most we will
pay for all damages because of or arising
out of bodily injury to one person in any
one occurrence.
(2) The limit stated for "each occurrence" is
the total amount of coverage and the most
we will pay, subject to a.(1) above, for all
damages because of or arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one
occurrence.

b.

Under property damage, the limit stated is the
amount of coverage and the most we will pay

An automobile and attached trailer are one automobile and do not increase the Limit of Liability.

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPULSORY
INSURANCE LAWS

LIMIT OF LIABILITY

a.

The Limit of Liability is not increased because
of the number of:

We will not duplicate payments available under this
or any other insurance for the same elements of
loss.
6.

OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other collectible automobile liability insurance, we will pay only our share of the loss. Our
share will be the ratio of the amount of this insurance to the total amount of all collectible automobile
liability insurance. The coverage extended to automobiles you do not own will be excess over any
other insurance available to you.

SECTION HI - DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE
COVERAGES
a.

Fire Coverage
We will pay for loss of or damage to your automobile and its equipment caused by:
(1) fire or lightning.

(2) smoke or smudge because of a sudden,
unusual or faulty operation of any fixed
heating equipment where your automobile
is stored.
(3) windstorm, hail, earthquake, explosion, external discharge or leakage of water. We
cover damage resulting from the stranding,

any
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./ policy or bond;
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your automobile on lana or water. We will
also pay for general average and salvage
charges for which you may be legally responsible.

but only if the damage exceeds the deductible amount.
e.

Theft Coverage

Road Trouble Service
We will reimburse you up to the amount stated
in the Declarations for this coverage in any one
emergency:

We will pay for loss of or damage to your automobile and its equipment caused by theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage. We cover your loss
when you are tricked into giving your automobile to another person.

(1) for towing your automobile to the nearest
available garage; and
(2) for the cost of labor performed on your automobile at the place of the emergency.

Comprehensive Coverage
We will pay for loss of or damage to your automobile and its equipment from any cause except upset or collision with another object or
with a vehicle to which it is attached.

f.

Other Automobiles Covered
The Damage To Your Automobile Coverages
provided for your automobile also apply to certain other automobiles. They apply:

We will also pay for:

(1) to an automobile you do not own which is
temporarily used as a substitute for your
automobile. Your automobile must be out
of use because of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

(1) glass breakage from any cause including
upset or collision;
(2) damage caused by missiles or falling objects; and

(2) to an automobile of the same type which
you acquire after the inception date of the
current policy term subject to the following:

(3) damage caused by collision with an animal
or bird.
When a deductible is indicated in the Declarations for this coverage, we will reduce our payment by that amount.

(a) If the automobile replaces your automobile, we will apply only those coverages that apply to the automobile
being replaced. You must report the
replacement automobile to us no later
than the expiration date of the policy
term during which the automobile was
acquired.

Collision Coverage
We will pay for loss of or damage to your automobile and its equipment caused by accidental
collision with another object or by accidental
upset.

(b) If the automobile is an additional automobile and we insure all automobiles
you already own, we will apply only
those coverages which are common to
all of your automobiles we insure provided you:

When a deductible is indicated in the Declarations for this coverage, we will reduce our payment by that amount. If your automobile is a
private passenger automobile, the deductible
does not always apply. It does not apply in a
collision with another automobile:
(1) we insure and which you do not own, rent
or have in your care, custody or control; or
(2) whose owner or operator has been identified; and

1)

report the additional automobile to
us within 30 days of delivery; and

2)

pay any required additional premiums.

These extensions do not apply when there is
other insurance covering your interest or the
interest of the owner. However, paragraph f.(1)
above applies if you are legally liable.

(a) is legally responsible for the entire
amount of the damage; and

5

EXCLUSIONS
Fire, Theft, Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
do not apply to:
a.

j.

any caddy, case or container designed for storing or carrying stereo tapes, cassettes, discs
or cartridges.

k.

unless described in the Declarations and a
premium charged:

loss of or damage to your automobile because
of confiscation or destruction by any civil or
governmental authorities because of illegal activities engaged in by:

(1) a camper body; or
(2) a pickup cover with built-in cooking and
sleeping equipment.

(1) you; or
(2) a relative.

I.

This exclusion does not apply to a loss payee's
interest in your automobile.
b.

c.

d.

loss of or damage to your automobile because
of or arising out of your intentional act or an
intentional act committed at your direction or
with your knowledge. This exclusion does not
apply to a loss payee's interest in your automobile.

(1) standard or optional equipment from the
manufacturer of your automobile for that
make, model and model year;
(2) permanently installed in the dash or console opening designed for such equipment;
or

conversion, embezzlement or secretion by any
person lawfully having your automobile under
a sale, lease or similar agreement.
any automobile while:
(1) preparing for;
(2) practicing for; or

(3) described in the Declarations and a premium charged.
m. a radio, stereo, stereo tape deck, compact disc
player or other similar device designed for the
reproduction of sound, including related items.
However these devices are covered if:
(1) standard or optional equipment from the
manufacturer of your automobile for that
make, model and model year; or

(3) participating in;
any prearranged racing speed or demolition
contest.
e.

loss of use, except as provided in Coverage
Extensions.

f.

wear and tear, freezing, mechanical or electrical breakdown, other than burning of wiring,
unless this damage follows and results from
other loss or damage covered by this policy.

g.

(2) permanently installed in your automobile.
Our liability under m.(2) above shall not exceed
$1000 unless a greater amount is shown in the
Declarations and a premium charged.
n.

Any device designed or used to detect or locate
radar or any other speed measuring or calculating apparatus.

tires, unless the loss or damage is caused by:

o.

radioactive contamination.

(1) fire;

p.

loss caused by:
(1) declared or undeclared war or insurrection;
or

(2) theft; or
(3) malicious mischief; or

(2) explosion of a nuclear weapon or its consequences.

is part of other damage covered by this policy.
h.

i.

A citizens-band radio, mobile or cellular telephone, television or other similar device for
sending or receiving communications, including
related items.
However, these devices are
covered if:

a stereo tape or disc player:

COVERAGE EXTENSIONS

(1) that is not attached to your automobile; and

a.

Trailers

(2) is not receiving its power from your automobile's electrical system.

The Damage To Your Automobile Coverages
provided to your automobile extend to certain
trailers you do not own. The trailer must:

stereo tapes, cassettes, discs or cartridges or

(1) be designed for use with a private passen-
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o«~/ice designed for the reproduction
of sound, including related items.

(3) be other than a trailer of the home, office,
store, display, or passenger type.

b.

c.

(d) property used in a business, trade or
profession.

Our limit of liability for all loss and damage under this coverage extension is $500 in any one
occurrence.

(e) money or jewelry.

Loss Of Use By Theft

(f)

Under Theft Coverage or Comprehensive Cov-.
erage, we will reimburse you for transportation
expenses if your private passenger automobile
is stolen. We will pay up to $10 per day but not
more than $300 in one occurrence. We will pay
such expenses incurred beginning 48 hours after you report the theft to us and to the police
and ending when your automobile is returned
to use or we pay for its loss.

LIMIT OF LIABILITY

Transportation Cost

a.

(g) property specifically insured.
(4) Our limit of liability for all loss or damage
under this coverage extension is $200 in
any one occurrence.

Under the coverages for Damage To Your Automobile we will reimburse you for expenses
you incur for transportation from where your
automobile was disabled to your home or intended destination. The maximum payment is
$25 for each occurrence.
d.

any device designed or used to detect
or locate radar or any other speed
measuring or calculating apparatus.

We will pay no more than the lowest of the following:
(1) the actual cash value of stolen or damaged
property;
(2) the necessary cost, at local prices, to repair or replace the property or damaged
parts with material of similar kind and
quality; or

Personal Property

(3) the Limit of Liability stated in the Declarations.

If your automobile is a private passenger automobile, we will extend the Comprehensive
Coverage and the Collision Coverage that apply
to your automobile to loss of or damage to personal property contained in or on your automobile. This coverage extension is subject to the
following:

b.

We will, at our option, replace your automobile
with a new one of equal value or pay you your
original purchase price if:
(1) your automobile is a private passenger automobile;

(1) The personal property must be owned by
you, a relative, or your employee.

(2) you purchased it new;
(3) we determine the loss or damage can not
be repaired; and

(2) Comprehensive Coverage is extended only
for loss or damage because of:

(4) the loss or damage occurs within 90 days
of the purchase date.

(a) fire;
(b) lightning;
(c) theft or attempted theft.

c.

Your automobile may have been altered, remodeled, converted or modified so that its value is substantially increased over that of a
standard automobile of the same make and
model. In that case, we will pay only a proportional share of any loss or damage. We will pay
the proportion that the value of a standard automobile bears to the value of your automobile.
This applies only when alteration, remodeling,
conversion or modification affects the amount
of the loss. It does not apply when an additional
premium is charged based on the increased
value.

d.

If a loss can be paid under either Comprehensive or Collision Coverage, payment will be

Unless the entire automobile is stolen,
there must be visible signs of someone
breaking into the automobile for (2)(c)
above to apply.
(3) This coverage extension does not apply to:
(a) stereo tapes, cassettes, discs or cartridges or related items.
(b) a citizens-band radio, mobile or cellular telephone, television or other similar device for sending or receiving
communications, including
related
items.
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made under the coverage that pays you the
most.

SECTION IV - INDIVIDUAL NAMED INSURED
the first named insured in the Declarations is an indivi dual and the automobile described in the Declarations is a
rivate passenger automobile the following extensions of coverage apply.
LIABILITY COVERAGE
PERTY DAMAGE
a.

BODILY INJURY AND PRO-

(b) used by you, such relative or the
chauffeur or household employee of
either.

The Liability Coverage provided for your automobile also applies to an automobile not:
(1) owned by or furnished or available for regular use to you or anyone living with you.
However, we will cover your liability for
your use of an automobile owned by or
furnished for the regular use of a relative.

(3) you or a relative using an automobile without a reasonable belief of permission to do
so.
2.

DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE
a.

(2) used in an automobile garage repair shop,
sales agency, service station or public
parking business you own or operate.
b.

(2) used in an automobile garage, repair shop,
sales agency, service station or public
parking business you own or operate.

to you;

(2) to relatives who do not own an automobile;
and
(3) to anyone legally responsible for the use
of the automobile by the persons in (1) and
(2) above.
c.

(1) owned by or furnished or available for regular use to you or anyone living with you.

We extend this coverage only:
(1)

b.

We extend this coverage only:
(1) to you; and
(2) to relatives who do not own an automobile.

c.

We do not cover:

We do not cover an automobile used in your
business or occupation or that of a relative unless it is:
(1) a private passenger automobile; and

(1) the owner of the automobile, but when we
cover a trailer used with the automobile,
we cover the owner of that trailer.
(2) an automobile used in your business or
occupation or that of a relative, unless it is:

The Damage To Your Automobile Coverages
provided for your automobile also apply to an
automobile not:

(2) used by you, such relative, or the chauffeur
or household employee of either.
d.

(a) a private passenger automobile; and

These extensions do not apply when there is
other insurance covering your interest or the
interest of the owner. However, they do apply
if you are legally liable.

SECTION V - WHAT YOU MUST DO AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS
NOTIFY US PROMPTLY
a.

b,

You and any person seeking coverage under
this policy must notify us promptly as to how,
when and where the accident happened. We
must have the names and addresses of any injured person and of any witnesses. Notice and
documentation of loss must be given if we require it. Any loss or damage caused by theft,
larceny, robbery, pilferage or trickery must be
promptly reported to the police.
If claim is made or suit is brought against you
or any person entitled to coverage, we must be
advised promptly. All papers in connection with

c.

Under Uninsured Motorist Coverage and/or
Underinsured Motorist Coverage, any person
making claim must:
(1) give us written notice and documentation
of loss;
(2) submit to examinations by pnysicians we
select as often as we require; and
(3) authorize us to obtain medical reports and
other pertinent records.
We must be given copies of the legal papers if
suit is brought against any person believed to

a.

TUU ana any person seek..,g coverage under
this policy must cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense of any claim or
suit. This includes submitting to a statement
under oath and giving us access to any documents which we request.

b.

When a claim is made for damage to your automobile, you must let us examine the vehicle
before repairs are made or evidence of loss
removed.

c.

Following damage to your automobile, every
reasonable effort must be made to protect the
vehicle against further loss. We will pay the
reasonable expenses incurred to do this.

a.

If we makw a payment under this policy and the
person to or for whom payment is made-has a
right to recover damages from another, we will
be entitled to that right. That person shall do
everything necessary to transfer that right to us
and shall do nothing to prejudice it.

b.

The person to or for whom payment is made
under Uninsured Motorist Coverage and/or
Underinsured Motorist Coverage must hold in
trust for us his rights of recovery against any
legally liable person. He must do all that is
proper to secure such rights and must do nothing to prejudice them. He must take any required action in his name to recover damages
and reimburse us out of any proceeds to the
extent of our payment.

SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS
POLICY PERIOD AND TERRITORY

3.

We will not cover any person seeking coverage under this policy who has made fraudulent statements
or engaged in fraudulent conduct with respect to
procurement of this policy or to any occurrence for
which coverage is sought.

This policy applies only to accidents and losses
which happen during the policy period as shown in
the Declarations. They must take place within the
United States of America, its territories or possessions, Canada or Mexico or between their ports.
4.

CHANGES
a.

This policy contains all the agreements between you and us or any of our agents relating
to this insurance, the terms of this policy may
not be changed except by written endorsement
issued by us.

b.

We may adjust your premium during the policy
term because of changes in the factors that
were used to determine such premium. These
factors include but are not limited to:

FRAUD

LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US
a.

No legal action may be brought against us until
there has been full compliance with all the
terms of this policy. Further, under the Liability
Coverage no legal action may be brought until
we agree a person entitled to coverage has an
obligation to pay or until the amount of that obligation has been determined by judgement after trial. No one has any right under this policy
to bring us into any action to determine the liability of any person we have agreed to protect.

b.

Bankruptcy or insolvency of any person we
have agreed to protect will not relieve us of any
obligation under the terms of this policy.

(1) the principal place of garaging your automobile;
5.
(2) coverages, limits of liability and deductibles;

SEVERABILITY
Except as to our limit of liability, the coverage provided by this policy applies separately to each person against whom claim is made or suit is brought.

(3) the type, make and model of your automobile and its use;

6.

(4) the operators of your automobile.

DUPLICATION OF COVERAGE
a.

If this policy and any other policy or form of
coverage provided by us or a company affiliated
with us, provide coverage for the same loss or
damage, our maximum limit of liability under
all the policies or forms of coverage shall not
exceed the highest limit of liability under any
single policy or form of coverage applicable to
the loss or damage.

b.

This condition does not apply to any policy or
form of coverage issued by us or a company

Premium adjustments will be made at the time
of such changes or when we become aware of
the changes, if later. We will use the governing
rules and rates in effect on the inception date
of the policy term.
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affiliated with us to specifically provide excess
insurance over this policy.

b.

your legal representative but only with respect
to his legal responsibility for the maintenance
or use of your automobile; and

c.

any person having proper temporary custody
of your automobile until a legal representative
is appointed;

ASSIGNMENT
No interest in this policy may be assigned without
our written consent. But, if you should die within the
policy term, the policy will cover as though named
in the Declarations:
a.

your spouse, if you are an individual;

10

provided we are given written notice of your death
within 60 days, this requirement does not apply with
regard to your spouse.

It is agreed:
1.

SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE; 1. COVERAGE; a. Liability Coverage - Bodily Injury and Property Damage
extends to an automobile you hire, lease or borrow for use in your business. This coverage extension does not
apply to:
a.

any automobile:
(1) you own;
(2) owned by your executive officers or partners; or
(3) you lease while that automobile:
(a) is leased to you in writing in accordance with a written agreement in which the lessor holds you
harmless; and
(b) is used pursuant to operating rights (permits) granted to you by a public authority;

b.

the owner of an automobile you hire, lease or borrow or the owner's agents or employees;

c.

a lessee from whom you sublease an automobile or the lessee's agents or employees; or

d.

any automobile covered elsewhere by this insurance or any of its extensions.

2.

SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE; 1. COVERAGE, b. Trailers and c. Other Automobiles Covered; and 3. COVERAGE EXTENSIONS are deleted.

3.

The following conditions apply in addition to those contained in SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS of the policy.
a.

Premium
(1) The premium stated in the Declarations for this coverage extension is provisional. We shall compute the
earned premium for each policy term on the basis of the total cost ycu incur to hire automobiles during
that term. We shall use the rate for the coverage in effect on the inception date of the term.
(2) Additional premium will be charged or a refund made, whichever is appropriate. However, we shall retain the minimum premium for this coverage extension.

b.

Examination of Your Books and Records
We may examine and audit your books and records to determine the premium for this coverage at anytime:
(1)

during the policy term, and

(2) within one year after the expiration of this insurance.
c.

OTHER INSURANCE
This coverage extension is excess of any other available insurance.

All other terms and conditions of the policy apply.
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Automobile Policy
It is agreed:
When Combined Liability is shown under Coverages in the Declarations, SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE, 4, LIMl"
OF LIABILITY is deleted and replaced by the following:
4.

LIMIT OF LIABILITY
a.

We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage up to the Limit of Liability stated in the Declara
tions. The Limit of Liability is the amount of coverage and the most we will pay for all damages because o
or arising out of:

1)

ail bodily injury; and

2)

all property damage;

in any one occurrence.
b.

The Limit of Liability is not increased because of the number of:
1)
2)
3)
4)

c.

automobiles shown or premiums charged in the Declarations;
claims made or suits brought;
persons injured; or
automobiles involved in the occurrence.

An automobile and attached trailer are one automobile and do not increase the Limit of Liability.

All other policy terms and conditions apply.

Automobile Policy
It is agreed:
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE does not apply to bodily injury sustained by any person:
1.

while in or upon; or

2.

getting into, out of, on to or off of;

your automobile that is a motorcycle, motor scooter or motorized bicycle.
All other policy terms and conditions apply.

79355 (1-9

NO-FAULT INSURANCE ENDORSEMENT

It is agreed*
SECTION I - DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply to this endorsement.
ment

Definitions contained in the policy do not apply to this endorse

1.

Elimination period means the 3 days following the motor vehicle accident.

2.

Injured person means:
a.

you, when injured in an accident involving any motorized vehicle, except when the injury is the result of the
use or operation of a motor vehicle you o w n that is not insured by this endorsement;

b.

a relative, when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, except when the injury is the result of the
use or operation of a motor vehicle owned by the injured relative that is not insured by this endorsement;
and

c.

any other natural person whose injuries arise out of a motor vehicle accident:
(1)

while occupying the insured motor vehicle with your express or implied consent; or

(2)

while a pedestrian, if the accident involves the insured motor vehicle and occurs in the State of Utah

3.

Injury means physical injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including resulting death of that person.

4.

Insured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle*
a.

to which the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy and personal injury protection coverage of this endorsement apply; and

b.

for which you are required to maintain the o w n e r ' s or operator's security required by the State of Utah.

5.

Motor vehicle means every self-propelled vehicle that is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers and
semi-trailers designed for use with such motorized vehicles. Motor vehicle does not include traction engines,
road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well drillers and every vehicle that is propelled by
electric power obtained from overhead wires but not operated upon rails.

6.

Occupying means being in or on a motor vehicle as a passenger o r operator, o r being engaged in the immediate
acts of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor vehicle.

7.

Operator means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.

8.

Pedestrian means any natural person not occupying a motor vehicle.

9.

Relative means a person who resides with you and w h o is related to you by blood, marriage or adoption or who
is your ward o r foster child. Relative includes such person who usually resides in your household but temporarily
lives elsewhere

10. We, us or our means the Company providing this insurance
11. You o r your means the first natural person or organization named in the Declarations.
SECTION II - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
1.

COVERAGE
a.

We will pay personal injury protection benefits to o r for an injured person who sustains accidental injury
arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle.

b.

Personal injury protection benefits shall consist o f
(1)

medical expenses benefits meaning the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental and rehabilitation services, including.
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(c) hospital and nursing services; and
(d) nonremedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method <
healing.
(2) loss of income and earning capacity of an injured person from an inability to work for a maximum perio
of 52 consecutive weeks beginning three days after the date of the loss of income and earning capacity
If the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the date of loss, the eliminatio
period shall be waived.
(3) an allowance for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but fc
the injury, the injured person would have performed for his or her household for a maximum period c
365 days beginning three days after the date of the accident. If the disability continues for longer tha
two consecutive weeks after the date of injury, the elimination period shall be waived.
(4) funeral, burial or cremation benefits.
(5) compensation for death of an injured person, payable to the injured person's personal representative fo
the benefit of his or her heirs.
EXCLUSIONS
We will not pay personal injury protection benefits because of injury:
a.

sustained by the injured person while occupying a motor vehicle owned by or furnished to or available foi
regular use by the injured person or any relative of such injured person, if the motor vehicle is not an insurec
motor vehicle.

b.

to any person while operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of you or a
relative or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle.

c.

to any person, if that person's conduct contributes to his or her injury by intentionally causing the injury tc
himself or herself or while committing a felony.

d.

to any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises.

e.

to any person because of war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or any
act or condition incident to any of the preceding.

f.

to the owner, operator or occupant of a motorcycle, trailer or semitrailer, if such injury occurs while operating
or occupying any of these vehicles.

g.

to any person resulting from radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials.

h.

to any person sustained as a pedestrian, if the accident takes place outside the State of Utah. This exclusion
does not apply to you or a relative.

LIMITS OF LIABILITY
a.

Our liability for payment of personal injury protection benefits to or for any one injured person for injury because of or arising out of any one accident shall not exceed the following:
(1) S3,000 for medical expenses. If a larger amount is shown in the Declarations,, we will pay up to that
amount.
(2) 85% of loss of income and earning capacity, subject to a maximum of S250 per week.
(3) S20 per day for household services the injured person would have performed.
(4) $1,500 for incurred funeral, burial or cremation expenses.
(5) A total of $3,000 for death of the injured person.

b.

The amount we pay shall be reduced by:
(1) any benefits the injured person receives or is entitled to receive under any workers' compensation or
similar statutory plan; and
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1.

ACTION AGAINST US
No legal action may be brought against us until there has been full compliance with all the terms of this coverage.

2.

NOTICE
In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the injured person, and also
reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances of the accident shall be given
by or on behalf of each injured person to us or any of our authorized agents as soon as practicable.
If an injured person, his or her legal representative or his or her dependent survivors shall institute legal action
to recover damages for injury against a person or organization who is or may be liable, a copy of the summons
and complaint or other process served in connection with such legal action shall be forwarded to us as soon as
practicable by the injured person, his or her legal representative or his or her survivors.

3.

MEDICAL REPORTS and PROOF OF CLAIM
As soon as practicable, the injured person or someone on his or her behalf shall give to us written proof of claim,
under oath if required, including full particulars of the nature and extent of the injury, treatment and rehabilitation
received and contemplated, and such other information as may assist us in determining the amount due and
payable. The injured person shall submit to physical and mental examination by physicians selected by us when
and as often as we may reasonably require. We shall pay for such examinations.

4.

NON-DUPLICATION AND COORDINATION
Coverage afforded by this endorsement is primary coverage for only injury sustained by an injured person in an
accident arising out of the operation or use of the insured motor vehicle as a vehicle.
No injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance, including approved plans of self-insurance. If an injured person has other similar insurance that is available
and applicable to the accident, that total amount recoverable shall not exceed the amount payable under the
provisions of the insurance providing the highest dollar limit. "We shall not be liable for an amount greater than
the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the sum of the limits of liability of all applicable insurance that
applies on the same basis.

5.

SUBROGATION
In the event of any payment under the provisions of this endorsement, we are subrogated to the rights of the
person to whom or for whose benefit the payments were made to the extent of those payments. That person must
do everything necessary to secure such rights, do nothing to prejudice those rights, and shall execute and deliver
to us instruments and papers necessary to secure his or her rights and obligations under this provision. Any
recovery shall go first to the injured person for any unpaid loss, then to us.

All other policy terms and conditions apply.
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UOV*-RAGE

agreed:
DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply in addition to those contained in SECTION I - DEFINITIONS of the policy.
a.

Occupying means being in or on an automobile as a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from an automobile.

b.

Pedestrian means any natural person who is not occupying an automobile.

c.

Underinsured automobile means an automobile to which a liability bond or policy applies at the time of the
occurrence, however, the limit of liability is less than the amount of compensatory damages the injured
person is legally entitled to recover for bodily injury.
Underinsured automobile does not include an automobile:
(1) owned by or furnished to or available for regular use by you or a relative;
(2) owned by any governmental unit or agency;
(3) located for use as a residence or premises;
(4) that is designed for use primarily off public roads except while actually on public roads;
(5) that is an uninsured automobile. Uninsured automobile means an automobile:
(a) the operation, maintenance and use of which is not covered by a liability bond or policy at the time
of the occurrence.
(b) the operation, maintenance and use of which is covered by a liability bond or policy at the time of
the occurrence but the limits are less than:
(1) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence;
(2) subject to (1) above, $50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to two or more persons in any
one occurrence; and
(3) $15,000 because of liability for property damage in any one occurrence; or
(4) $65,000 in any one occurrence whether arising from bodily injury or property damage.
However, such automobile is uninsured only to the extent of the deficiency.
(c) insured by a company that is or becomes insolvent. However, such automobile is uninsured only
to the extent that the claim against the insurer is not paid by a guaranty association or fund.
(d) insured by a company that has issued a successful written denial of coverage.
(e) that is a hit and run automobile. By this we mean an automobile that causes bodily injury:
1)

by direct physical contact with the injured person or the automobile the injured person is occupying; or

2)

without direct physical contact with the injured person or the automobile the injured person is
occupying;

and whose owner or operator is unknown.
If there is no direct physical contact, the injured person must show existence of the uninsured automobile by clear and convincing evidence consisting of more than the injured person's testimony.
(f)

owned or operated by a self-insurer under any motor vehicle law provided such self-insurer is or
becomes insolvent and cannot provide the minimum amounts required by that motor vehicle law.
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• jraior or an undermsured automobile;

(2) for bodily injury sustained while occupying an automobile that is covered by SECTION II - LIABILITY
COVERAGE of the policy.
b.

If the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual, this coverage is extended as follows:
(1) We will pay compensator/ damages you are legally entitled to recover:
(a) from the owner or operator of any underinsured automobile;
(b) for bodily injury you sustain:
1)

when you are a pedestrian; or

2)

while occupying an automobile you do not own which is not covered by SECTION II - LIABILITY
COVERAGE of the policy.

(2) The coverage extended in (1) above is also afforded to a relative who does not own an automobile.
c.

The bodily injury must be accidental and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured
automobile.

d.

Whether an injured person is legally entitled to recover damages and the amount of the damages shall be
determined by agreement between the injured person and us. We will not be bound by any judgments for
damages obtained or settlements made without our written consent.

EXCLUSIONS
Underinsured Motorist Coverage does not apply:
a.

to punitive or exemplary damages.

b.

when the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual:
(1) to you while occupying or when struck by any automobile owned by you, if the automobile is not insured
for underinsured motorist coverage by the policy.
(2) to a relative while occupying or when struck by any automobile owned by that relative, if the automobile
is not insured for underinsured motorist coverage by the policy.
(3) to a relative while occupying or when struck by any automobile owned by you, if the automobile is insured for underinsured motorist coverage on a primary basis by any other policy.

c.

to any person while occupying any automobile owned by you, if the automobile is not insured for underinsured motorist coverage by the policy.

d.

to any person who settles a bodily injury claim without our written consent.

e.

to directly or indirectly benefit an insurer or self-insurer under any workers compensation, disability benefits
or similar law.

LIMIT OF LIABILITY
We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury up to the Limit of Liability stated in the Declarations as follows:
a.

The limit stated for "each person" is the amount of coverage and the most we will pay for all compensatory
damages because of or arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence.

b.

The limit stated for "each occurrence" is the total amount of coverage and the most we will pay, subject to
a. above, for all compensatory damages because of or arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons
in any one occurrence.

c.

If you or a relative sustains bodily injury while not occupying an automobile, the applicable limit of liability
available may equal but shall not exceed the highest limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage
applying to any one automobile for which the injured person is an insured.
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(i)

the limit of liability explicable to the automobile the injured person was occupying at the time of the oc
currence; and

(2) the highest limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage afforded by a policy that insures you 01
the relative.
e.

Except as provided in d. above, the limits of liability for two or more automobiles may not be added together,
combined or stacked to determine the amount of coverage available for bodily injury sustained by any injured
person in any one occurrence regardless of the number of:
(1) policies involved;
(2) automobiles involved;
(3) persons insured;
(4) claims made or suits brought;
(5) automobiles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
(6) premiums paid.

f.

The amount we pay will not duplicate any amounts paid or payable for the same bodily injury:
(1) under SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE of the policy;
(2) under any workers compensation, disability benefits or similar law; or
(3) by or on behalf of any person or organization who may be legally responsible for the bodily injury.

OTHER INSURANCE
a.

If this insurance and other insurance applies on a primary basis, we will pay our share. Our share shall be
the ratio of our limit of liability to the total of all limits which apply on a primary basis.

b.

If this insurance and other insurance applies on an excess basis, we will pay our share. Our share shall be
the ratio of our limit of liability to total of all limits which apply on an excess basis.

c.

The insurance we extend to automobiles you do not own shall apply as excess over any other insurance that
applies on a primary basis.

CONDITIONS
The following conditions apply in addition to those contained in the SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS of the
policy.
a.

TIME LIMITATION FOR ACTION AGAINST US
Any person seeking Underinsured Motorist Coverage must present a claim for compensatory damages:
(1) according to the terms and conditions of the policy; and
(2) within four years from the date of the occurrence.

b.

ARBITRATION
(1) If we and a person entitled to Underinsured Motorist Coverage under this endorsement do not agree:
(a) that the person is entitled to recover compensatory damages; or
(b) to the amount of those damages;
the matter may be arbitrated provided both we and the injured person agree to arbitration. If so, each
party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days,
either may request that a judge of a court having jurisdiction make the selection.
(2) Each party will pay its own arbitrator and share equally all other expenses of arbitration.
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All other policy terms and conditions apply.
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COLLISION COVERAGE AMENDATORY ENuORSEMENT

79282 02-*

Automobile Policy
It is agreed:
SECTION III - DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE, 1. COVERAGES, d. Collision Coverage is deleted and replaced by th<
following:
d.

Collision Coverage
We will pay for loss or damage to your automobile and its equipment caused by accidental collision with anothei
object or by accidental upset.
When a deductible is indicated in the Declarations for this coverage, we will reduce our payment by that amount,
If your automobile is a private passenger automobile, the deductible does not always apply. The deductible shall
not apply:
(1) in a collision with another automobile:
(a) we insure and which you do not own-, rent or have in your care, custody or control; or
(b) whose owner or operator has been identified; and
1)

is legally responsible for the entire amount of the damage; and

2)

is covered by a property damage liability policy or bond;

but only if the damage exceeds the deductible amount.
(2) to your legally parked private passenger automobile in the event it is accidentally struck by another of your
private passenger automobiles, provided Collision Coverage applies to both such automobiles.
All other policy terms and conditions apply.

Utah

79365(1-97)

UNINS JRED MOTORIST COVERAGE AMENDMENT
Automobile Policy
It is agreed:
If you are engaged in the business of or accept payment for, transporting natural persons by automobile or are a
school district that provides transportation services for its pupils:
1.

the uninsured motorist coverage provided is secondary to any other insurance covering the injured person; and

2.

the uninsured motorist coverage provided does not apply to an employee whose exclusive remedy is provided
by Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation.

All other policy terms and conditions apply.

Utah

79360 (1-97)

AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
Automobile Policy
It is agreed:
1.

Under SECTION I - DEFINITIONS, 9. Relative is deleted and replaced by the following:
9.

2.

Relative means a person who resides with you and who is related to you by blood, marriage or adoption or
who is your ward or foster child. Relative includes such person who usually resides in your household but
temporarily lives elsewhere.

Under SECTION V - WHAT YOU MUST DO AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS, 1. NOTIFY US PROMPTLY, a. is deleted
and replaced by the following:
a.

You and any person seeking coverage under this policy must notify us promptly as to how, when and where
the accident happened. We must have the names and addresses of any injured person and of any witnesses.
Notice given by or on behalf of you or any person seeking coverage or making claim to any authorized
agency of ours within Utah, with particulars sufficient to identify the policy, shall be considered to be notice
to us. Notice and documentation of loss must be given if we require it. Any loss or damage caused by theft,
larceny, robbery, pilferage or trickery must be promptly reported to the police.
Failure to provide notice or proof of loss within the time limit specified by us does not invalidate the claim if
you or the person seeking coverage can show that it was not reasonably possible to file the notice or proof
of loss within the prescribed time limit. This paragraph also applies to Uninsured Motorist Coverage and/or
Underinsured Motorist Coverage.

All other policy terms and conditions apply.

ROAD CONSTR

JTION, MAINTENANCE AND S O C I A L EQUIPMENT

79S17 (6.

Automobile Policy

It is agreed:
1.

SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE applies to any:
a.

road grader, road oiler, road roller or road scraper:

b.

asphalt spreader, tar spreader or concrete mixer:

c.

crane, steam shovel or gas shovel;

d.

ditch o r trench digger;

e.

air c o m p r e s s o r , sandblasting o r building surface cleaning machinery, septic tank cleaning or vacuum clea
ing e q u i p m e n t ;

f.

tree o r other spraying equipment:

g.

snow plow or loader;

h.

welding apparatus or well drilling machinery; or

incapable o f moving under its o w n power while towed by your automobile provided your automobile is insured fi
Liability C o v e r a g e .
2.

SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE does not apply to:
a.

any accident arising out of the operation of any:
(1)

c r a n e , steam shovel o r gas shovel;

(2)

ditch or trench digger;

(3)

a i r compressor, sandblasting or building surface cleaning machinery, septic tank cleaning o r vacuu
c l e a n i n g equipment;

(4)

t r e e or other spraying equipment;

(5)

w e l d i n g apparatus or well drilling machinery; or

(6)
unless such operation is solely for the purpose of locomotion; or
b.

any bodily injury or property damage covered by insurance provided by a n y other policy, form o r endorse
ment.

All other policy t e r m s and conditions apply.

POLLUTION LIABILITY EXCLUSION
Automobile Policy
t is agreed:
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE does not apply to:
I.

Bodily injury or property damage resulting from the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, release, escape,
seepage, migration, or dispersal of pollutants:
a.

that are, or are contained in any property that is:
(1) being transported or towed by, handled or prepared for placement into or upon, or taken from the automobile;
(2) otherwise in the course of transit by you or on your behalf; or
(3) being disposed of, stored, treated or processed into or upon the automobile;

b.

before such pollutants or property containing pollutants are moved from the place they are accepted by you
or anyone acting on your behalf for placement into or onto the automobile; or

c.

after such pollutants or property containing pollutants are removed from the automobile to where they are
delivered, disposed of or abandoned by you or anyone acting in your behalf.

1.a. above does not apply to pollutants that are needed or result from the normal mechanical, electrical or hydraulic functioning of the automobile or its parts, if the discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dispersal of such pollutants is directly from a part of the automobile designed to hold, store, receive or dispose of
such pollutants by the automobile manufacturer.
1.b. and I.e. above do not apply, if as a direct result of the maintenance or use of the automobile, pollutants or
property containing pollutants which are not in or upon the automobile, are upset, overturned or damaged at any
premises not owned by or leased to you. The discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dispersal of the
pollutants must be directly caused by such upset, overturn or damage.
Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any:
a.

request, demand or order that you or anyone else test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify
or neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of pollutants; or

b.

claim o r suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing for, monitoring,
cleaning up, removing, containing, treating, detoxifying or neutralizing, or in any way responding to, or assessing the effects of pollutants.

illutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
ids, alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases and waste. Waste materials include materials to be recycled, reconditioned
reclaimed.
other policy terms and conditions apply.

N E W L , ACQUIRED AUTOMOBILE C O V c R A G E

79540 ( w

Automobile Policy
It is agreed:
-f.

COVERAGE
Provided all automobiles you own that are licensed for use on public roadways, except any that are out of servic
because of mechanical breakdown or damage sustained in an accident, are scheduled in the Declarations on tl"
inception date of the current policy term, we will extend:
a.

Liability Coverage;

b.

Comprehensive Coverage;

c.

Collision Coverage;

d.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage and Underinsured Motorist Coverage;

e.

Automobile Medical Payments or any mandatory no-fault insurance coverages;

as provided for those scheduled automobiles to any additional automobile you acquire during the current polic
term. The extension applies only for the remainder ofthe current policy term.
2.

CONDITIONS
The following conditions apply to this coverage extension in addition to those contained in SECTION VI - GEh
ERAL CONDITIONS of the policy.
a.

Comprehensive Coverage is extended only if it applies to all automobiles scheduled in the Declarations o
the inception date of the current policy term. We shall reduce our payment by $100 fgr each claim made wit
respect t o each automobile covered by this endorsement.

b.

Collision Coverage is extended only if it applies to all automobiles scheduled in the Declarations on the ir
ception date of the current policy term. We shall reduce our payment by $250 for each claim made with re
spect to each automobile covered by this endorsement.

c.

If a claim is made under this endorsement, you shall be charged the appropriate premium for the automobil
involved in the loss. The premium charge shall be made from the date you acquired the automobile throug
the end of the current policy term.

d.

We may examine and audit your books and records to determine the premium for this coverage at any time
(1)

during the policy term; and

(2) within one year after the expiration of this insurance.
e.

You shall report all additional automobiles to us within 30 days following the expiration of each policy term

f.

We shall compute the actual earned premium for each policy term on a pro-rata basis determined by th
number of additional automobiles you acquire during the current policy term.

All other policy terms and conditions apply.

